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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last financial crisis, what should the Federal Reserve
(the Fed) have done when lenders stopped making loans, even to bor-
rowers with sterling credit and strong collateral?' Because the central
bank is the last resort for funding, the conventional answer had been to
lend freely at a penalty rate against good collateral, as Walter Bagehot
suggested in 1873 about the Bank of England.2 Acting thus as a lender of
last resort, the central bank will keep solvent banks liquid but let insol-
vent banks go out of business, as they should. The Fed tried this, but
when the conventional wisdom did not work, it provided liquidity to new
products and firms using authority enacted during the Great Depression
to deal with financial emergencies-section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act (the Act).3
It worked, but it came at a price-the Fed lost legitimacy in the
eyes of many.4 The new emergency-liquidity programs, however, were
needed to make Bagehot's rule relevant in a credit market where deposit-
funded loans now compete with credit-risk products originated by both
banks and nonbanks, 5 and where these products are traded actively. Once
I. Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the
U.S. Financial Cycle, EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 28 (forthcoming) ("There is an enormous amount of
assessment and analysis that needs to be done both with respect to the actions of thc Fed during the
financial crisis and the apparent expansion of its mission.").
2. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (1873).
3. This was the text of section 13(3) at the time of the crisis:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal
reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates established in
accordance with the provisions of section 357 of this title, to discount for any individual,
partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts,
and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal
Reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange
for an individual or a partnership or corporation, the Federal reserve bank shall obtain ev-
idence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institutions. All such discounts for individuals, part-
nerships, or corporations shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations
as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.
12 U.S.C. § 343(a) (1991).
4. "An election year posse is being formed in Washington to try to round up the perpetrators of
the Great Recession." Massimo Calabresi & Bill Saporito, The Street Fighter, TIME, Feb. 13, 2012,
at 22-27 (covering Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for S.D.N.Y.); see also Adam J. Levitin, In Defense
of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 437 (2011) ("The government's handling of the crisis provided wide-
spread dissatisfaction because of its haphazardness, because of its lack of transparency, and because
of the use of taxpayer dollars.").
5. A minority of voices-none from the legal community-have strongly supported the Fed's
emergency-liquidity efforts. PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 115 (Princeton Univ. Press 2011); R. Glenn Hubbard, Hal
Scott & John Thornton, The Fed Can Lead on Financial Supervision, WALL ST. J., July 25-26,
2009, at A13 (criticizing Fed bashing and proposals to reduce its independence); Alex J. Pollock,
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credit becomes a tradable commodity, you need "market makers" to
make the trading go smoothly.6 This dynamic is apparent in the market
for U.S. Treasury debt. Uncertain about the rate that the Treasury will
have to pay, it announces its borrowing needs and holds an auction.7 The
Treasury wants to ensure enough demand for its debt.
8
Enter the "primary dealers"-firms that have promised to buy part
of each new debt issue that the Treasury auctions.9 These nonbank firms
are market makers in the primary market (where an instrument is first
issued) because they promise to "take down" some of each auction's
debt, boosting the debt's initial value by adding demand for the new is-
Fed Stretches Elastic Currency Mandate, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 2011, at 8 (arguing that Fed's
efforts were justified bascd on its mandate to build an "elastic" currency); William H. Buiter & Anne
C. Sibert, The Central Bank as Market Maker of Last Resort 1, FIN. TIMES BLOG (Aug. 12, 2007),
http://mavcrecun.blogspot.con2007/08/ccntral-bank-as-market-makcr-of-last.html.
6. This Article builds on a central insight from my decade as a market regulator: price discov-
ery for financial products takes place against a background of enormous public, private, and mixed
coordination that is usefully understood as "market making." This is especially true now that the
credit market has been securitizcd. I saw this at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, where
I worked on the dealer and trading activities of national banks. Working for two apex issuers of
public debt securities-the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury-showed me how the borrowing
needs of massive issuers like these could, effectively, drive market structure, including by creating
new products. For example, the World Bank is credited with having pioneered the large-scale swap
in 1981 to meet a foreign exchange need. Bruce S. Darringer, Swaps, Banks, and Capital: An Analy-
sis of Swap Risks and A Critical Assessment of the Basle Accord's Treatment of Swaps, 16 U. PA. J.
INT'L BUS. L. 259, 273 (1995); see also Kenneth D. Garbadc, Why the U.S. Treasury Began Auction-
ing Treasury Bills in 1929, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV., July 2008. While at the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (Commission), I inspected the specialist function at the New York Stock
Exchange (a self-regulatory organization), learning about market makers' affirmative and negative
duties and seeing how exchanges could administratively redetermine certain price outcomes deemed
inconsistent with a specialist's stabilization duties. At the Commission, I also participated in inter-
agency surveillance of the repurchase market for primary dealers, my first contact with the collateral
markets that became prominent during the last crash. Conventional notions of "market regulation"
often address consumer protection and fraud, but not enough attention is paid to the varieties of
market making that influence price. This is a crucial issue in an era like ours, in which the border
between the state and the market is under review. For a good recent survey of the policy issues in-
volved in public control over the economy, see generally VITO TANZI, GOVERNMENT VERSUS
MARKETS: THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE (2011).
7. For an example of how the refunding process works, see Most Recent Quarterly Refunding
Documents, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-ccnter/data-chart-
ccnter/quarterly-refunding/Pages/Latest.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). Before the auction, the
Treasury estimated that they would need about $182 billion in debt to pay for maturing debt and for
new expenses. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces Marketable Borrowing
Estimates (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/prcss-centcr/press-relcases/Pages/
tg I 556.aspx.
8. Demand has fallen short at least twice. In March 1920, the Treasury's attempt to raise $300-
350 million netted only $200 million, and in December 1922 an attempt to raise $400 million raised
only $310 million. Garbade, supra note 6, at 31,39.
9. In doing so, the buyer is said to be adding "market liquidity" to the financial product. See
Jos6 Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit Marker, 34 J.
CORP. L. 447, 472 (2009).
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sue. 10 In the secondary market (all subsequent deals), market makers per-
form a similar function by using their own capital to trade against the
trend-buying when the customer wants to sell and selling when the cus-
tomer wants to buy. 1
Between March and December 2008, the Fed used its section 13(3)
emergency powers to act like a market maker in the primary and second-
ary markets for credit products.' 2 To tailor these efforts to the new credit
market, the Fed created limited-liability companies and ran secured lend-
ing programs, especially for nonbank firms that had become active in the
credit market. 13 These companies and programs added liquidity to "struc-
tured finance," so called because these are assets created by rearranging
10. When market makers are managing liquidity, prices adjust more slowly than they would
otherwise because the market maker is applying gentle but steady price pressure in the opposite
direction of a customer order that might otherwise go unmet. The liquidity boosts the value of the
financial product because owners know that they can sell the product quickly without taking a "fire
sale" discount. Having a steady flow of transactions helps other investors who own the product price
their existing positions. Making it easier for a firm to convert the financial product into cash helps
that firm's individual liquidity because if cash is needed for settlement, the product can be liquidated
in a pinch. Because market-making liquidity stabilizes prices and mitigates breakdowns on either
side of the market, both the issuer of a financial product and investors in that product benefit from
the efforts of the market maker, who makes money by capturing a spread between what it buys and
sells for.
II. Here is a good description of how some market makers see their role:
"Market maker" is a native term. It expresses the trader's sense that he creates the market
by his own action. He stands at the center of the market mechanism. In continuous mar-
kets, such as stocks, bonds, and futures, there are specified trading hours. During trading
hours the market maker is always available, offering to trade from his own inventory in
response to market user's order flow. In a broader, collective sense, market makers have
also been the market organizers. They establish and maintain the trading floors. They do
this by standardizing terms of trade, by enacting and enforcing rules of conduct, and by
creating institutions to ensure that all traders' obligations are met.
MITCHEL Y. ABOLOFIA, MAKING MARKETS: OPPORTUNISM AND RESTRAINT ON WALL STREET 6
(1996). There arc many ways to arrange market-making systems. See generally YAKOv AMIHUD,
THOMAS S.Y. HO & ROBERT A. SCHWARTZ, MARKET MAKING AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 113 (1985).
12. With the exception of one lending program, this Article considers only emergency-liquidity
initiatives implemented by the Fed under section 13(3), primarily for nonbank firms. In addition to
these initiatives, the Fed also used its section 13(3) authority to enter into a loan or a loss-sharing
guarantee with Bear Steams, Citigroup, and Bank of America. Johnson, supra note I, at 14. Alt-
hough these three transactions complemented the Fed's emergency liquidity programs, they arc not
examples of the market making that this Article examines. Moreover, these firms have paid exit fees
and terminated these programs. Id. Similarly, though I draw on some documents related to the Trou-
bled Assets Relief Program, this Article does not consider other bank liquidity programs established
by the Treasury or Congress.
13. These programs made assets more liquid insofar as they could be converted to cash quickly
and easily. This kind of liquidity "speaks to the ease with which one can trade an asset (in this case,
a loan) at its expected price. You can gauge market liquidity by measuring the difference between
the sale price and the purchase price of a fungible commodity: the narrower this spread, the more
liquid the market is said to be." Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 457 (internal citation omitted).
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the cash flow from other financial instruments.' 4 Just as last resort lend-
ing made banks more liquid, these emergency programs made structured
finance assets and their investors more liquid.' 5 By doing this, the Fed
calmed down credit markets, was repaid on its emergency lending, and
put taxpayers in a position where we stand to make even more money on
these deals. 16
As a magazine cover noted, however, "Ben Bernanke saved the
global economy. So why does everyone hate him?"' 7 Rounding out the
debate, this Article argues that the Fed's section 13(3) efforts were large-
ly compelled by structural changes in the credit market. Once traditional
banks had been overtaken by nonbank lenders and a capital markets-
based model for financing themselves, the Fed had little choice but to
become a market maker of last resort, stabilizing the credit market by
adding liquidity, term, and price discovery.18 A separate article will ex-
amine the financial overhang to the Fed from these efforts.' 9
14. Johnson, supra note 1, at 7. He identifies six major activities: (1) tamping down the Fed
funds rate; (2) discount window lending; (3) foreign-currency swaps with foreign central banks; (4)
individualized lending to non-depository institutions; (5) general lending programs for non-
depository institutions; and (6) large-scale purchases of mortgage-backed securities.
15. A firm is liquid insofar as it can pay its debts as they become due. When asset liquidity
dries up, a finn's liquidity can follow. These liquidity dynamics were especially acute in the inter-
bank market. Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 456-60.
16. The notion of "market maker of last resort" is an analogy to the lender-of-last-resort func-
tion. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30354, MONETARY POLICY AND THE FEDERAL
RESERVE: CURRENT POLICY AND CONDITIONS 2 (Aug. 3, 2012) ("Its financial stability function is as
"lender of last resort" to the nation's financial system.").
17. Roger Lowenstein, The Hero/The Villain, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 2012, at 49. Indeed, the
consensus in the legal community is also that the Fed got it wrong. Robert D. Auerbach, The Fed's
Backroom Bailout Policy, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 535 (2009) (blaming the Fed's autonomy for alleged
defects in its stabilizing activities); Timothy Chapman, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the
Rule of Law: From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 369, 391-96 (2009) (concluding that Fed's capture by banking interests drove its stabi-
lizing activities); Chad Emerson, The Illegal Actions of the Federal Reserve: An Analysis of How
The Nation 's Central Bank Has Acted Outside the Law In Responding to the Current Financial
Crisis, I WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 109 (2010) (concluding that the Fed exceeded its authorities
and mission); Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Fed-
eral Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221 (2010) (finding that some stabilizing
transactions exceeded the Fed's statutory authority).
18. Bruce Mizrach & Christopher J. Neely, The Microstructure of the U.S. Treasury Market 19
(Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2007-052B, 2008) ("A crucial issue in the
market microstructure literature is price discovery. This is the process by which prices embed new.
information.").
19. The Fed's emergency liquidity programs changed its financial structure such that it tripled
in size, diversified its assets, got more leveraged as banks increased their reserves, and became more
profitable. Trying to understand these changes and their regulatory implications induced this Article.
As my research proceeded, however, so many unaddressed normative questions remained in the
legal and policy literature about the trading that had been the predicate for these financial changes
that I concluded that a more basic analysis of the Fed's trading (this Article) was needed to frame the
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This Article focuses on the historical, legal, and policy justifica-
tions for the Fed's actions and concludes that the Fed's actions were
readily defensible on several grounds. First, the Fed's recent efforts were
just the latest expression of the Fed's open-ended authority to trade fi-
nancial products for its own account, especially during credit emergen-
cies.20 Second, the policy rationale for these efforts is that credit market
dynamics had become influenced by a "shadow banking" sector that a
traditional lender of last resort could not reach.2' To influence the con-
temporary version of the traditional credit function-borrowing short to
lend long term-the Fed would have to expand its emergency liquidity
facilities.22 Finally, the Fed's market making is congruent with the Fed's
century-old symbiotic relationship with banks, so we should reconsider
our naivet6 about what has long been a corporatist relationship.23
This argument has four steps. Part I is an argumentative history that
emphasizes the Fed's past as a financial-products trader for its own ac-
count.24 The goal is to counter its more familiar-yet incomplete-
incarnation as a traditional lender of last resort. As both author and regu-
lator of a financial system, the Fed's authority was generative, unfolding
as its target markets and its own responses evolved.25 Fruit of a difficult
genealogy of the Fed's balance sheet. In a separate article, I will address how the Fed's expanded
trading activities financialized the Fcd's asset, liability, and equity accounts.
20. The term "generative" refers to the way that Melvin Eiscnberg describes adjudication by
common law judges. See generally MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (199 1)
(insisting that structural gaps exist in positive formulations of legal rules and that judges routinely
act interstitially to complete the rule through particular decisions). Because credit markets can pre-
sent the same variety and unpredictability that fact patterns do to a common law judge, the transac-
tional means that the Fed has at its disposal must be equal to the task.
21. ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 458, SHADOW
BANKING (2010) (analyzing how the shadow banking sector funds itself).
22. This is one of the defining functions of a bank. Jos6 Gabilondo, So Now Who Is Special?:
Business Model Shifts Among Firms That Borrow to Lend, 4 MD. J. Bus. & TECH. L. 261, 265 &
n.38 (2009). Doing so is fraught with peril. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 21, at I ("However, credit
intermediaries' reliance on short-term liabilities to fund illiquid long-term assets is an inherently
fragile activity and may be prone to runs.").
23. Corporatism refers to "a system of social and political organization in which major societal
groups or interests (labor, business, military, ethnic, clan or patronage groups, religious bodies) are
integrated into the governmental system, often on a monopolistic basis or under state guidance,
tutelage and control, to achieve coordinate national development." HOWARD J. WIARDA,
CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS: THE OTHER GREAT "ISM" 84 (1997).
24. Not trained as an economic historian, I have rendered the past based on a contemporary
understanding of how financial markets work. Professional historians continue to contest basic fac-
tual conclusions about the Fed's role in previous financial crises. Perhaps unlike a professional histo-
rian, I advocate a normative conclusion, informed by history.
25. One example would be the statutory mandate that the Fed create a market for bankers'
acceptances: "the provisions of the Act with respect to bankers' acceptances had as their objective
the development of a market for what was considered a new type of commercial paper in the United
States." HOWARD H. HACKLEY, LENDING FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: A
HISTORY 53 (1973).
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birth, the Fed went from being a banker's bank in the Progressive Era to
a market maker for Treasury securities, maturing into a real central bank
only in the post-War period after its independence from the Treasury: Its
trading authority has grown steadily, especially since the enactment of its
section 13(3) emergency powers during the Great Depression.
When bad things happen to good assets, a central bank should lend
until things get back to normal.26 As described in Part II, though, in 2008
the Fed lent against seemingly dubious collateral-structured finance-
by setting up limited-liability companies and secured lending programs
that extended the Fed's emergency liquidity protection beyond banks.2 7
These "financial hospitals" breathed value into moribund assets by hold-
ing them to maturity, making them liquid by exchanging them for cash-
equivalents, and providing price discovery by trading them when other
firms did not want to. 28 These financial hospitals represented the Fed's
shift from just a lender of last resort to also a market maker of last re-
sort.2 9
Part III examines the impact of making this shift on the Fed's polit-
ical legitimacy as a market actor. Did these expanded liquidity efforts
interfere with market dynamics? 30 Quite the contrary. By replicating
26. Otherwise, it can be the economy as a whole that suffers. Kevin Warsh, Governor, Fed.
Res. Sys., Speech at the New York University School of Law Global Economic Policy Forum: Fi-
nancial Turmoil and the Federal Reserve: The Plot Thickens (Apr. 14, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/ncwsevcnts/spcech/warsh200804l4a.htm) ("The central bank's re-
sponsibility is not to individual firms but to financial markets, and only then, to the extent that finan-
cial market stresses affect the real economy.").
27. From the perspective of credit quality, the worst deal was Maiden Lane I1l, which invested
in asset-backed securities that were themselves collateralized not by a real cash flow but by other
asset-backed securities. I explain this by analyzing the audited financial statements of the Fed's
collateral deals. See infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
28. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 115 ("[T]he central lesson of the crisis is that the American
system requires the Fed's support as dealer of last resort, not just in the money market... but also in
the capital market, and not just for Treasury securities.., but also for private securities."). Professor
Steven Schwarcz has argued that financial markets need an entity to provide market liquidity be-
cause shifts in the credit market have increased the importance of new lenders and products. Steven
L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 248-57
(2009). Such an entity would invest against a bear cycle when falling prices were due to a panicky
market. Id. at 248-49. This entity would buy "securities of artificially falling financial markets-
markets in which the price of securities falls measurably below the intrinsic value of the assets un-
derlying the securities (which might result from a panic)." Id. The Fed did a version of this.
29. See MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 115 (arguing that the Fed became a dealer of last resort);
Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5 (arguing that Fed should act as a market maker of last resort); Thorvald
Grung Moe, Shadow Banking and the Limits of Central Bank Liquidity Support: How to Achieve a
Better Balance Between Global and Official Liquidity 5-6 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No.
172, 2012) (calling for a "new Bagehot rule" for market maker of last resort role).
30. One of the initial obstacles to understanding the Fed is that much of what it does amounts
to trying to engineer price outcomes, blurring any bright-line distinction between the public and the
private. Jose Gabilondo, Sending the Right Signals: Using Rent-Seeking Theory to-Analyze the Cu-
ban Central Bank, 27 HOus. J. INT'L L. 483, 490 (2005) ("[A] central bank is perhaps the only gov-
2013]
Seattle University Law Review
market standards-including fair-value accounting and collateralization
norms 31 -these efforts created a constructive market and jumpstarted
trading in the secondary market. Were these efforts legal? Yes. They
rested on statutory authority intended for just such emergencies. Did
some of these efforts lack the transparency popularly associated with
democratic oversight of the economy? I am afraid so, but it may be a
price worth paying. When it comes to the financial sector, the Fed strikes
an original balance between public and private interests with special ben-
efits for both. Overall, this bargain makes sense, a point with which the
antigovernment Right and the finance-phobic Left should jointly disa-
gree.
Part IV recommends the repeal of a provision in the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010 that requires the Fed to get the Treasury's approval before
doing such programs in the future.32 Hearkening to the Fed's past as a
market maker hostage to the Treasury, this is a bad idea because it fur-
ther politicizes the Fed's emergency liquidity programs.
II. THE FED'S HISTORICAL TRADING AUTHORITIES
For purposes of this Article, change gears by thinking of a lender as
a borrower looking for funds to lend. This is called "funding" a loan.
33
Say you apply for a $100,000 mortgage loan and-wanting predictabil-
ity-prefer a fixed-rate loan with repayment spread out over thirty years.
Assume that the lender lends to you at 5%. It looks for the best rate it can
find in its funding market, say $100,000 for one year at 1% payable at
maturity. By borrowing at 1% for one year and lending at 5% for thirty
emnment actor that performs its regulatory functions on the market by transacting in the market again
and again.").
31. For a discussion of the accounting and collateral aspects of the Fed's programs, see infra
notes 226-35, 240--59.
32. See infra notes 444-59.
33. Funding a loan means moving cash from the bank's financial backer through the bank and
to its client. In an accounting sense, it means that the balance sheet for the bank reflects an asset
based on the loan to the client, offset by some blend of liability and equity reflecting who the bank
got the funds from. When its cost of funds is less than its return on those funds, the bank makes
money. A recent analysis of net interest margins for national banks suggests how low interest rates
can undermine bank profitability: "after three consecutive years of record low interest rates, banks
are unlikely to realize further benefits from lower funding costs. Given a fairly static outlook for
interest rates and loan growth in 2012, net interest margins will likely show little incremental im-
provement in the near term." OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, SEMIANNUAL RISK
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE NATIONAL RISK COMMITTEE 15 (Spring 2012); see also OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK ON INTEREST RATE RISK (1998)
(providing analysis and examination procedures for interest rate risk management in a national
bank's credit portfolio) ("Interest rate risk is the risk to earnings or capital arising from movement of
interest rates. It arises from differences between the timing of rate changes and the timing of cash
flows ... from changing rate relationships among yield curves ... from changing rate relationships
across the spectrum of maturities.").
[Vol. 36:731
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years, the lender immediately becomes illiquid. Why? During the next
year, it will receive a trickle of cash flow from its thirty-year asset (you),
but not enough to repay its debt of $100,000. So the lender must re-
finance at the end of the year.34 Imagine if lenders did not do this-it
would be you refinancing your mortgage or student loans every year or
even more frequently.
35
This happens in the "funding" market, with which the Fed has al-
ways had an intimate relationship. The drafters wrote the Federal Re-
serve Act with banks in mind as the lenders.36 The drafters saw that
fragmented markets made it hard for banks to mobilize the funding need-
ed to finance business conditions. They hoped that a decentralized sys-
tem of regional lenders that could trade short-term debt would help banks
fund themselves. Once the system was up and running, though, the Fed
found that it was better to buy and sell government securities in the open
market. It was the beginning of its career as trader.
A. Bank Funding Before the Fed
Paper money began in the American colonies during the seven-
teenth century.37 This money included private debt instruments in the
form of letters of credit and bills of exchange. 38 Also, private banks char-
tered under state law issued promissory notes that served as money.
39
The value of the notes fluctuated based on the issuing bank's reputation.
34. Because the bank will have received one year's worth of interest and principal from its
borrower, this time it will need to borrow less than $100,000. And so on. Assuming that it refinances
only with one-year loans, the bank will do this twenty-eight more times before the mortgage is paid
off.
35. It was when collateral markets froze up that the most acute episodes of the financial crisis
took place. Donald L. Kohn, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Columbia Busi-
ness School Conference on the Role of Money Markets: Money Markets and Financial Stability
(May 29, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.fedcralreservc.gov/newsevents/speech/
kohn20080529a.htm (explaining how securitization had made collateral markets a more central part
of the credit market). Within this market, repurchase agreements emerged as particularly important.
Peter Hordahl & Michael R. King, Developments in Repo Markets During the Financial Turmoil,
BIS Q. REV., Dec. 8, 2008, at 37, 42-51 (emphasizing that risk management and operational risk in
repo markets deserve more attention).
36. I use the term "bank" to mean financial institutions that hold customer deposits. This in-
cludes firms that did universal banking before the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 as well as those sub-
sequently defined as "depository institutions" for purposes of federal banking regulation. By "non-
bank" I mean not only broker-dealer investment banks but also other firms that borrow to lend in the
"shadow banking" sector. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 2 1.
37. 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 48-49 (2002)
(noting Virginia bill of exchange from 1668 and private letter of credit from 1718).
38. Id.
39. Because not all depositors will demand their money back at the same time, the bank gam-
bles by loaning out its liquid funds for repayment over a longer term. Other than what the market
will bear, there is no theoretical limit to how much money a bank can make by leveraging its de-
mand deposits this way, unless a law or regulation provided otherwise.
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Colonial governments also began to issue bills of credit to finance public
expenditures.40
As a financial system, this left a lot to be desired. Rather than a sin-
gle dominant currency, private bank notes and other forms of money pro-
liferated. Also, credit and money markets were fragmented, limiting their
ability to respond flexibly to changes in business conditions.4'
In particular, it was hard to solve a liquidity panic without a central
authority to provide stopgap funding to stem a bank run.42 If depositor
requests for withdrawals were honored quickly and in an orderly manner,
a panic would pass as depositors recovered confidence that their money
would be safe with the bank. This method required a deep pocket to act
as a lender of last resort to fund withdrawals until the panic passed. A
central bank following Bagehot's policy for emergency liquidity could
serve this role, but establishing a central authority in the United States
would face many hurdles.
Alexander Hamilton saw the advantages of a more unified financial
system.43 Regional markets would be linked, trade could increase, and
more could be done to limit financial panics. The question of paper mon-
ey was related to a unified system. In 1729 and again in 1767, Benjamin
Franklin advocated for having more paper money because it would add
to real wealth by boosting commodity prices and wages and encouraging
manufacturing. 44 Inspired by the Bank of England, Hamilton tried to es-
tablish a Bank of the United States in 1790, making southern planters
40. 1 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 50-51 (Benjamin Franklin had recommended their issue).
41. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 31 ("The inelasticity of the note issue, combined with the
rigidity of required reserve ratios, meant that deposits could not so easily expand and contract as
needed."). Disagreeing, some economic historians view early financial markets as more integrated.
See generally HOWARD BODENHORN, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM
AMERICA: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF NATION-BUILDING
(2000) (arguing that antebellum financial markets were fairly well-integrated until the Civil War).
42. Between 1873 and 1907, the banking system experienced five major panics when particular
firms could not meet their obligations. Eugene White, To Establish a More Effective Supervision of
Banking: How the Birth of the Fed Altered Bank Supervision (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16825, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6825. These liquidity
crises would likely have been avoided by a lender of last resort. Michael D. Bordo & David C.
Wheelock, The Promise and Performance of the Federal Reserve as Lender of Last Resort 1914-
1933, FED. RES. BANK ATL., http:// www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/10jekyll_
bordo_pres.pptx (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) ("The recurrent instability of the National Banking Era
was the principal motivation of the reform movement that led to the Federal Reserve Act."); see also
White, supra at 26 ("Contemporary experts and most historians believe that a lender of last resort
could have squelched most panics by providing credit to liquidity-constrained banks in the midst of a
crisis.").
43. See generally RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 344-61 (2004).
44. Id.; I MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 50, 56 (mentioning Franklin's 1729 Modest Enquiry
into the Nature and Necessity of A Paper Currency and his 1767 Remarks and Facts Concerning
American Paper Money).
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bristle.45 In the end, Congress chartered the Bank of the United States,
which operated from 1792 until the expiration of its charter in 1811.46 A
second Bank of the United States was attempted after the War of 1812,
but it was abolished twenty years later.47
Soon enough, the drawbacks of not having a central banking au-
thority became apparent. Congress wanted to increase federal control
over credit to promote a stable, uniform currency, make it easier for
banks to fund themselves, and give the authorities a tool for adjusting the
money supply.48 It started issuing paper money-United States notes-in
1862.49
Congress also began considering the notion of bank reserve re-
quirements. Banks created money because-except in a run-all of their
depositors would not want to recover their deposits at the same time. 50 So
banks were able to issue liabilities that people used as money. Out of
prudence, a bank had to keep some cash in its vault-its reserves-to
satisfy the anticipated withdrawal requests of some depositors, but the
bank could lend out the rest.5' Reserves went to the heart of the incipient
45. Dependent on credit, they feared that the Bank would advantage the New England mercan-
tile establishment, a protean version of today's financial sector. CHERNOW, supra note 43, at 349.
("Some central-bank critics thought the institution would aggrandize northern merchants at the ex-
pense of southern agrarians."). The conflict would draw lines in the sand that would later harden into
the system of political parties that we recognize today. Id. at351.
46. I MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 89. The Bank earned the enmity of competing state banks
by helping the United States obtain a high credit rating. Id. at 122. By a close vote, its charter was
not renewed in 1811. Id. at 126-27.
47. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC 36
(2009).
48. I use "money supply" to mean the sum generally of cash and credit in the economy. Be-
cause this Article spans periods during which different forms of money and credit existed, I do not
use more recent measures of monetary aggregates. See generally R.W. HAFER, THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 258-62 (2005) (entry on "MONEY" summarizing its history
and its empirical measurement by the Fed); Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of
Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL
CRISES 109, 164 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991) (noting that "authors frequently used the terms
'money' and 'money market' loosely, sometimes meaning cash, sometimes credit").
49. Legal Tender Act of February 25, 1862, 12 Stat. 345. These notes were redeemable in gold
between 1879 and 1933.
50. Joshua N. Feinman, Reserve Requirements: History, Current Practice, and Potential Re-
form, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 569, 569 (1993).
51. A "reserve" is an amount of cash held in a bank's vault or in an account with the Fed from
which it can draw to meet customers' demand for currency. From the point of view of an individual
bank, keeping enough reserves avoids the unfortunate situation in which customers demand more
cash than the bank has on hand, leading to a run. This insurance against a customer run on deposits
did not come free, though, because until very recently, banks earned no money on reserves, meaning
there was an opportunity cost in terms of foregone return from investing those reserves into loans or
other investments. Hence a bank's goal was to keep as little in reserves as possible and to relend any
reserves in excess of what was required by federal banking regulation.
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credit system, influencing both sides of a bank's balance sheet.52 In time,
states imposed reserve requirements to make sure that the bank had
enough cash in the vault to honor a depositor's demands for cash. 3
Congress took a step towards federalizing the money supply with
the National Bank Act of 1864, which offered a national bank charter.54
The cost was that national banks had to hold a 25% reserve against their
deposits and notes, more than the amount required by most states. More
would be needed, though, to create a national financial system.
B. The Banker's Bank (1913-1923)
One of the important ways that banks funded themselves was
through short-term commercial paper.56 When a farmer needed credit to
finance a crop or a merchant needed credit to buy goods, the farmer or
merchant would borrow money from a bank and issue it a promissory
note, typically for a short term and without security or collateral. The
bank "discounted" the note, giving the borrower less than the face value,
just as you do when lending to the federal government by buying a sav-
ings bond.57 When the borrower repaid the face value of the note, the
lender captured the discount as interest, with higher discount rates result-
ing in more interest being paid.
52. Decisions about which kind of asset to hold-for example, holding vault cash or making a
loan-turned not just on a borrower's credit but on the bank's rcservc position. This also affected a
bank's liability structure because deciding to make a new loan from liberated reserves meant the
bank could finance it with new borrowing, thus becoming more leveraged.
53. To make sure that banks could honor the demands of their clients for cash, rules required
banks to keep a certain amount of cash on reserve in their vaults. Cash on hand in excess of the
required reserves could be lent out, although some would have to be held back to ensure that the new
loan was backed by enough reserves. The strictest system would allow a bank to lend out only the
amount that it had to spare assuming that all depositors were paid. In contrast, states used a fraction-
al reserve system that let banks lend out a multiple of their demand deposits: the higher the reserve
requirement, the lower the bank's ability to gross up its assets by making new loans. Initially, states
did not require issuing banks to keep reserves on hand, although some banks did so to make their
notes more attractive. Feinman, supra note 50, at 572. Some states imposed reserve requirements
during the nineteenth century, but most states had no such requirements when the Civil War began in
1861.
54. National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99.
55. Feinman, supra note 50, at 572.
56. Timothy D. Rowe, Commercial Paper, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET II 1-25
(Timothy Q. Cook & Timothy D. Rowe eds., 6th ed. 1986). This kind of debt is key because if the
firm is not liquid enough to honor the debt, it becomes an issue of solvency.
57. Because money is a commodity that has use value (it buys things and settles debts), a lend-
er demands interest as compensation for parting with this use value over the life of a loan. These
notes did not pay interest.
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Relevant to funding, the commercial paper market also let the bank
control its own liquidity.58 It could pledge the discounted note to another
bank, which would lend a smaller fraction of the note's face value by
"rediscounting. ' '59 This gave banks in a funding pinch an alternative to
selling their assets at a fire sale price.60 The commercial paper market
was fragmented, however, requiring concerted action by Congress to uni-
fy regional markets. Given the objections to central banking, this would
be a tough sell in Congress.
The Panic of 1907 helped to make the case for a central bank. 6 The
1907 crisis had been solved only through the collective action of private
bankers led by J.P. Morgan.62 The following year, Congress established a
national commission to analyze the Panic of 1907 and to propose a
mechanism to avoid a recurrence of financial disruptions.63 The commis-
sion concluded that only a central bank authority could effectively miti-
gate the risk of crises like the Panic of 1907.64 The National Reserve As-
sociation proposed by the commission, however, involved a decentral-
ized arrangement of regional banks that would be operated largely 'by
private bankers.65
This plan failed because, as seen by the Senate and the House, it
gave large banks too much power.6 6 Also, some favored centralization
while others favored the dispersal of power between regional reserve
banks.67 After Woodrow Wilson became President, Virginia Representa-
tive Carter Glass took responsibility for shepherding the project. 68 He
introduced an alternative to the commission's bill that was eventually
enacted as the Act after several compromises that balanced the reformist
58. At the time, banks also entered into repurchase agreements to get short-term liquidity by
pledging collateral. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 34 (noting that the "asset structure" of banks includ-
ed securities other than commercial loans that could be used as collateral for loans).
59. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 11.
60. Id.
61. It involved the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, which threatened to bring
down other firms too. That time, private collection action coordinated by J. Pierpont Morgan
stemmed the panic by investing against the trend. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 31-34.
62. Id.
63. The details of the plan emerged after a retreat at Georgia resort, Jekyll Island, owned by
John D. Rockefeller and J.P. Morgan. Id. at 44-45 (analyzing origin of the Fed).
64. Id. at 42 ("The Monetary Commission concluded that a central banking authority was
needed to provide liquidity in times of stress.").
65. Id. at 43 (analyzing origin of the Fed).
66. TIM TODD, THE BALANCE OF POWER I I (Bill Medley ed., 2009); see also 2 MARKHAM
supra note 37, at 44.
67. TODD, supra note 66, at 12-13.
68. Id. at 12.
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impulses of the Progressive Era with the preference of bankers for self-
69
regulation.
The resulting Act created a central board in Washington and a
loosely federated network of reserve banks with ties to their local econ-
omies. 70 The system was expected to serve several goals. First, the Fed
would support bank funding by creating liquidity facilities that would
allow banks to convert their assets into cash or cash equivalents. 71 These
facilities could also serve the lender of last resort function to help man-
age panics like the one in 1907.72 Second, the Fed would also make the
credit supply more responsive to the needs of business by making the
currency "elastic," in that its size would fluctuate with business condi-
tions.73 Third, the Fed would have authority both to lend money through
discounting and to buy and sell some financial assets in the open mar-
ket.74 Congress also gave the Fed "incidental powers" to carry out its
75
These authorities were "generative" because the Fed was expected
to both create money systems and regulate them. So, for example, in ad-
dition to rediscounting commercial paper, the Fed was charged with de-
veloping a market for banker's acceptances, a way to give banks another
source of funding liquidity.76 The Fed was also expected to develop a
national system for check clearing.77
69. WIARDA, supra note 23, at 134 ("[T]hc Progressives sought to rein in and regulate the
largely unchecked capitalism of the time. Labor unions were also becoming stronger; the social
question was coming to the fore.").
70. The Act produced twelve reserve banks and a board in Washington to which the Secretary
of the Treasury belonged ex officio. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 37. The board represented centraliza-
tion while the reserve banks served proxies for the regions. TODD, supra note 66, at 13-14. During
the early days of the Fed, the regional reserve banks were associated with private interests while the
board was seen as closer to the government. I ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE 467 (2003) (discussing proposals by incoming Fed chair Eccles to limit the power of the
regional Reserve banks). The New York Federal Reserve emerged as the leader of the latter. TODD,
supra note 66, at 19-22.
71. 2 MARKHAM. supra note 37, at 46-47.
72. Id. at 9-12; HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 9-12.
73. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 46-47.
74. The Act gave the Fed two separate grants of power relevant to financial markets. The Fed
could enter into collateralized loans to its member banks by "discounting" certain financial assets.
Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 13, 38 Stat. 251, 263 (1913). The Fed could also enter
into "open market" transactions, which were purchase and sale transactions on a wider variety of
assets with virtually any counterparty. Id. § 14, 38 Stat. at 264. This Article groups both discounting
and open market transactions as "trading" by the Fed because-for purposes of my discussion-both
share the same nucleus of investment risk and produce similar liquidity effects, for both the Fed and
its counterparty. Combining the authorities this way is consistent with the modern approach of 12
U.S.C. § 412 to collateral for the issuance of Federal Reserve notes.
75. 12 U.S.C. § 341 (1913).
76. 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 46-47.
77. Id.
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Rediscounting was central to liquidity, currency elasticity, and the
lender-of-last-resort function because the Fed would pursue all three pol-
icies through its "discount window," the physical site of these deals.78
When a customer wanted dollars, the customer would tender a bill to the
bank, and the bank would discount it. If the bank needed currency, it
could present that bill at the Fed's window, which would rediscount it by
giving the bank cash or, more likely, crediting its reserve ledger at the
Fed.79 The cash (or the ledger adjustment) would leave the bank with
more reserves than before the transaction, meaning that the bank now
had fresh resources that it could lend or invest.80 Assuming a healthy
profit interest on the part of the bank and demand for credit, the bank
would make new loans. This made credit and money elastic because their
supply would increase to fund growth.8 ' The same thing would happen in
reverse. 82 The Fed would later find other ways to influence reserves.
83
78. Rcdiscounting would go to the heart of the Fed's mission, as suggested by the Act's pre-
amble: "to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, [and] to
establish a more cffective supervision ofthe banking in the United States." Federal Reserve Act, 38
Stat. 251, 25 1; see also HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 9 (listing creation of commercial paper market
as the first major purpose of the Act).
79. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 1I.
80. Id. at 3 (noting importance of rediscounting provisions to the House and Senate Banking
and Currency Committees). The Act also introduced Federal Reserve notes to substitute for national
bank notes. National banks were still allowed to issue circulating bank notes after the Fed was estab-
lished, provided that they kept certain reserves and that they collateralized the issuance of these
notes with United States bonds posted with the Treasury. That way, if called to redeem a national
bank note, the Treasury could reimburse itself for the costs of doing so. National banks stopped
issuing notes after 1935, although at least as of 1981, there were still outstanding notes.
81. Id. at I1.
82. As a customer paid off its commercial bill to the bank, the bank would settle with the Fed.
Thus, the money supply would shrink as the original borrower paid off the bills. Since 1961, the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago has published a superb workbook that explains how reserve ad-
justments impact both an individual bank and the national money supply. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF CHICAGO, MODERN MONEY MECHANICS: A WORKBOOK ON BANK RESERVES AND DEPOSIT
EXPANSION (2011). To absorb cash from banks it must sell securities cheaply enough, and to add
cash to bank balance sheets the Fed must pay enough to make banks sell their securities. There is
one difference between reserve expansion through open market purchases by the Fed of government
securities and reserve contraction through open market sales by the Fed. Id. at 12. When the Fed
wants to shrink the money supply, banks must go through the serial liquidation of offsetting asset-
liability positions to bring down the amount of reservable liabilities to that amount that can be sup-
ported by the lower amount of reserves, Id. In contrast, when the Fed wants to expand the money
supply, it is relying on the bank's goal of increasing financial return to engage in market transactions
to rclend the fresh deposits. Id. Now that the Fed pays interest on excess reserve balances, banks
may have less of an incentive to leverage their excess reserves.
83. Today, the Fed has several ways of influencing bank reserves. First, by rule the Fed can
adjust the calculation of the reserve requirement to lower or raise the number directly. Second, the
Fed can make it easier for banks to meet their reserve requirements by lending them money at the
Fed's discount rate, an interest rate that is set by Board policy on certain collateralized loans. Giving
banks access to cheap money through the discount window has the effect of relaxing reserve pres-
sure on the banks. Third, the Fed can also make cheap money available to a bank by buying some of
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The Fed was expected to make a uniform discount rate effective
across the country.84 Because what would qualify for discounting as
commercial paper was not clear, the Act gave the Fed discretion to make
this determination. At first, discounting by the Fed was subject to strict
limitations through the "real bills" doctrine, which restricted eligibility
for discount to short-term instruments deemed to have little default risk.85
Restricting the kind of assets that could be pledged as collateral limited
the ability of banks to get funding. Moreover, the Federal Reserve could
issue notes only against collateral that was eligible for discount. These
two restrictions limited how much "give" the credit supply had.
Some Members of Congress had urged for the original statute to
create a system that could lend directly to individuals. 86 Congress reject-
ed this idea, though, because the Fed was intended as a system of "bank-
ers' banks" that would not compete with commercial banks in the retail
credit market.87 Credit allocation to nonbanks was also seen as a political
decision, better left to other parts of government in charge of fiscal
spending.88
Nevertheless, Congress began expanding the Fed's lending authori-
ty almost immediately, starting with authority to provide credit through
the securities in a bank's investment portfolio. Called "open market" operations, these transactions
are priced on market terms, instead of being priced administratively. As with the proceeds of dis-
count window borrowing, the proceeds from selling securities can be deposited with the Fed as a
reserve. Fourth, the Fed can reduce the cost to a bank of obtaining financial resources for meeting
reserve requirements by participating in the federal funds market, an over-the-counter market where
banks sell their excess reserves and buy those of other banks.
84. The Fed will change the discount rate only in response to a request from a reserve bank.
TIM TODD, UNDER PRESSURE: POLITICS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE DURING THE 1990-1991
RECESSION 51 (Lowell C. Jones ed., 2011), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/
UnderPressure/UnderPressure.pdf.
85. At first, eligibility for rediscounting depended largely on the "real bills" doctrine. General-
ly, this meant that a bill also had to be negotiable, have a term of not more than ninety days, and be
endorsed by the member bank that had originally discounted the bill. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at
13-16, 22-24. The theory behind this doctrine (also known as the "commercial loan" doctrine) was a
bank could limit its risk by lending only for activities that would generate a cash flow matching the
terms of the loan repayment, i.e., "self-liquidating" paper. Id. at 191. Although advanced as a rule to
limit risk, in hindsight it was understood to have contributed to economic cycles too, because an
expanding economy would mean that there were more productive activities looking for financing.
See Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 472 (arguing that the real bills doctrine illustrated Minsky's hedge
financing). In 1963, the Fed began to urge Congress to abolish these technical requirements and,
instead, let the reserve banks rediscount any commercial paper deemed by them to be sound. 1963
FED. RES. BD. ANN. REP. 198 (March 31, 1964) (recommending that technical requirements for
collateral be eliminated). In 1970, the Board did away with the requirement that rediscounted bills be
negotiable. 56 FED. RES. BULL. 444 (1970) (eliminating the requirement that discount window col-
lateral be negotiable).
86. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 127.
87. Id.
88. Walker F. Todd, FDICIA 's Emergency Liquidity Provisions, 16 ECON. REV. I (1993) (not-
ing theoretical and policy limits on fiscal activities by central banks).
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advances to its member banks.89 In 1916, Congress gave the Fed authori-
ty to make fifteen day collateralized advances. 90 The collateral could in-
clude Treasury bonds, giving banks another way to get funded.91 In ef-
fect, Congress was allowing the Fed to issue notes against Treasury secu-
rities, as national banks had done.92 That same year, Congress also rec-
ognized the Fed's role in making U.S. dollars available in foreign mar-
kets by letting the Fed rediscount banker's acceptances for "dollar ex-
change," a way to promote U.S. dollar-denominated trade finance.
93
C. Market Making (1923-1951)
The son that the Act's drafters had wanted was a banker's bank to
deal in private debt, that way helping banks fund themselves. 94 Instead,
the Fed found that trading government securities was a better way to in-
fluence credit conditions.95 This insight emerged out of the investment
practices of the Reserve banks, which bought Treasury securities from
commercial banks to boost their earnings.96 The selling banks would get
cash, which would result in excess reserves, just as discounting commer-
cial paper had. Because cash (like reserves) was fungible, banks could
fund loan growth without needing to use the Fed's discount facilities.97 It
worked in the other direction too.
98
It seemed, then, that by trading Treasury debt the Fed could influ-
ence bank reserves (and, hence, the money supply) just as discount win-
dow lending did.99 Trading was better than discounting, too, since it gave
the Reserve banks more control over the purchases and sales. 00 It also
avoided the adverse selection risk implicit in discount window lending:
banks with good credit tended not to use the discount window, which
89. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 83.
90. Id. at 84.
91. Id.
92. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 461, 39 Stat. 752 (1916).
93. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 65.
94. The Fed was to be a "banker's bank that would set discount rates and issue notes backed
with gold reserves and commercial paper." 2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 43.
95. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 35 (concluding that the rediscounting system did not work as
intended). The Fed discovered the power of open market operations in government securities by
"cosmic accident." Id. at 37.
96. Minutes, Fed. Res. Open Market Comm., Dec. 19, 1923, at 4-6 [hereinafter Dec. 19, 1923
Minutes]; see also I MELTZER, supra note 70, at 198-99 (explaining policy change in terms of ser-
endipity).
97. Dec. 19, 1923 Minutes, supra note 96.
98. When Reserve banks sold Treasury securities to commercial banks, these open market
operations soaked up the cash that banks had, leaving them with fewer resources with which to make
loans. So banks looking for funds would then discount more bills. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 5.
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would be used most enthusiastically by banks with lousy credit. So the
Fed decided to convert open-market operations from a revenue source for
Reserve banks into a tool for national credit policy.' ' New York Federal
Reserve Bank (NYFRB) President Benjamin Strong had been advocating
since 1915 that open market trading could have counter-cyclical effects
that promoted financial stability. 0 2 History would prove him right, alt-
hough it would take nearly a century.
During the Depression, Congress reconsidered the ban on Fed lend-
ing to individuals. In 1932, the Senate considered amendments to the Act
that would give the Fed authority to lend in "unusual and exigent circum-
stances" not only to individuals but also to corporations. 0 3 Initially, the
Senate proposed granting this authority only temporarily for two years. °4
The version of the authority that was finally signed by Herbert Hoover in
1932 as section 13(3) of the Act was broader, making the authority per-
manent and including partnerships as potential borrowers.0 5
Initially, these emergency powers imposed strict restrictions on the
collateral eligible to be used for a section 13(3) loan, however, so rela-
tively few loans were made during the Depression. 0 6 The Fed asked
Congress to relax the collateral requirement. 0 7 Three years after enact-
ment of the original authority, in what was styled as a "technical
amendment," Congress liberalized this authority by beginning to relax
the collateral requirements of section 13(3) by letting the Fed choose be-
tween requiring that credit be endorsed or secured. 
08
In 1935, Congress also validated the Fed's policy shift towards
trading government securities by statutorily establishing its Open Market
101. The Fed adopted the policy "[tihat the time, manner, character and volume of open-
market investments purchased by Federal Reserve banks be governed with primary regard to the
accommodation of commerce and business and to the effect of such purchases or sales on the general
credit situation." Minutes, Federal Reserve Open Market Committee, Mar. 22, 1923, at I [hereinafter
Mar. 22, 1923 Minutes]; see also I MELTZER, supra note 70, at 198-205 (explaining policy change
in terms of serendipity).
102.2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 189.
103. HACKLEY, supra note 25, at 128.
104. Id.
105. Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 709; see also HACKLEY, supra
note 25, at 128. Given how important this authority would turn out to be, this illustrates that Presi-
dent Hoover may deserve more credit for recognizing that the federal authorities had to intervene in
the financial sector more broadly than they may have understood their role to be. Although history
has credited Franklin Delano Roosevelt with many of the New Deal financial reforms, some of the
proposals for them started as early as 1931 at the behest of Hoover. Walker F. Todd, FDICIA's
Emergency Liquidity Provisions, 3 ECON. REV. 16, 17 (1993) (noting Hoover's attempt to expand the
Fed's lending authority to insolvent banks),
106. Id. at 18 (noting that between 1932 and 1936 only 123 loans for a total value of $1.5 mil-
lion were made under this authority).
107. Id.
108. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 322, 49 Stat. 684.
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Committee. 09 Trading credit had now become a structural element of the
Fed. Soon thereafter, the Fed announced that it would "maintain orderly
conditions in the money market."'"1° This signaled that the Fed was be-
ginning to think of itself more as a market maker.
When the Fed had first started conducting open-market operations
with government securities, the Treasury had objected, claiming that the-
se deals interfered with its own issuance goals."' However, open-market
purchases lowered the Treasury's borrowing costs, especially during the
Second World War." 12 Changing its mind, the Treasury did not want to
let go of this preferential financing arrangement when the War ended.
113
Concerned about rising inflation, the Fed wanted to increase interest
rates. 14 The Fed also wanted to avoid crowding out private market mak-
ers from dealing in Treasury securities.' " 5
Unrelated to its trading functions, Congress in 1946 gave the feder-
al government explicit responsibility for promoting adequate levels of
employment." 6 This mandate imposed contradictory obligations on the
Fed, which would now have concurrent responsibilities to both control
inflation and promote employment.' '7 The Fed would still be expected to
promote price stability, accomplished through keeping inflation in check
by making money "tight."" 8 It would also promote economic growth,
109. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 45. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has an excellent
publication that explains how today's FOMC works. See A Day in the Life of the FOMC, FED. RES.
BANK OF PHIL. (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.philadelphiafed.org/education/teachers/resourccs/day-
in-life-of-fomc/.
110. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 48.
Ill. 1 JANE W. D'ARISTA, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE, 122-23 (I 994) (noting Treasury
Secretary Mellon's opposition to the Fed maintaining a large portfolio of government securities).
112. 2 MARKHAM.supra note 37, at 299 (noting pressure from the Treasury and the President's
Council on Economic Advisers to tamp down the government's borrowing costs) ("During World
War II, Treasury officials decreed that interest rates would be kept at artificially low levels in order
to reduce government funding costs."). Although current rates are lower, the Fed and the Treasury
succeeded in keeping rates down. Three-month rates averaged 0.37% and long-term bonds averaged
2.3%. Id. at 261.
113. Id. at 299. Professor Markham suggests that the Fed's poor management of the Great
Depression made it easier for the Treasury to interfere in monetary policy.
114. Id.
115. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 52. The Fed pursued independence from the Treasury because
"the central idea was to support rebuilding of the dealer infrastructure of private capital markets." Id.
at 54.
116. The Employment Act of 1946 provides in pertinent part that "it is the continuing policy
and responsibility of the Federal government to use all practicable means.., to promote maximum
employment, production, and purchasing power." Employment Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-304, 60
Stat. 23 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1021).
117. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RES. SERV., R 41656, CHANGING THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S
MANDATE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 (Mar. 13, 2012) (analyzing the policy and economic perfor-
mance implications of serving mandate by targeting inflation).
118. Raising interest rates tends to slow down the growth of the economy by limiting discre-
tionary spending that is sensitive to interest rates. LABONTE, supra note 16, at 5.
2013]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:731
making money "loose" as needed to encourage spending. 19 How, exact-
ly, the Fed was expected to serve God and Mammon was never made
clear because tight and loose money represent antagonistic policies.
120
The Fed's conflicts with the political branches began to take root during
this period.'12
D. Independence (1951-2007)
Until well after the Second World War, the Fed had been a chimera
with disparate elements held together by political horse trading. 22 Only
in 1951 would these elements quicken into a central bank through the
Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord. 23 This is not to suggest that wran-
gling with the political branches abated--quite the contrary. 2 4 It did
119. Id.
120. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 4-8 (presenting core Keynesian assumptions and the mone-
tarist critique). During the 1970s, the U.S. economy suffered from high rates of both inflation and
unemployment. In this environment, Congress helped usher the Fed into the age of impossible ex-
pectations by passing the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. Emerson, supra note
17, at 118-19. Expanding on the policies set down by the Employment Act of 1946, the 1978 law
charged the Fed with promoting three goals: "maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate
long-term interest rates." Federal Reserve Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-188, 91 Stat. 1387 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 225(a), § 2A). The entire mandate reads as follows:
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Market
Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregate com-
mensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term in-
terest rates.
121. In 1948, President Truman pushed Chairman Marriner Eccles out of the chairmanship-
but not the board-after he tried unsuccessfully to increase reserve requirements, which would have
tightened the money supply. TODD, supra note 66, 27-28.
122. The contradictions reflected legislative compromises:
The Federal Reserve began operations in 1914 as a peculiar hybrid, a partly public, partly
private institution, intended to be independent of political influence with principal offic-
ers of the government on its supervisory board, endowed with central banking functions,
but not a central bank.
I MELTZER, supra note 70, at 725-26. During this period, Chairman William MeChesney Martin
gave the Fed its contemporary shape, further increasing the power of the board over the FRBNY,
resulting in a more cohesive structure. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 35; see also id. at 43 ("The
structure of the modern Federal Reserve is, in large part, Martin's creation.").
123.2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 300.
124. During the 1950s, proposals from congressmen to change the Fed kept coming, although
few prospered. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 224. East Texan Representative Wright Patman saw
the Fed as in cahoots with banks to keep interest rates high so as to exploit borrowers, especially
farmers. TODD, supra note 66, at 35. So he peppered the Fed with requests for information and tried
to bring it under tighter congressional control. Id. Presidents also pushed their preferences about
monetary policy. Despite pressure from President Truman to keep long-term interest rates to 2.5%,
the Treasury and the Fed agreed in 1951 that it would decide on monetary policy without interfer-
ence by the Treasury. Id. at 33. Angered by the Fed's decision to increase interest rates in 1965,
Lyndon B. Johnson tried unsuccessfully to push out Chairman William McChesney Martin. Id. at
37-38.
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mean that the Fed's decisions about monetary policy would no longer
have to take into account the borrowing preferences of the Treasury. The
Fed could instead raise rates immediately.
125
Vindicating the prescience of Benjamin Strong, open-market opera-
tions had come to replace the discount window as the key tool of credit
policy.' 26 Concerned that it might be pressured to support longer-term
borrowing by the Treasury ("quantitative easing" in today's euphe-
misms), the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) voted to.concen-
trate its portfolio on the short end of the yield curve.1 27 It became known
as the "bills only" doctrine. 28 Focusing on short-term debt-mostly
Treasury bills-meant that making markets for longer term securities
would be left to private firms.
129
During the 1960 presidential campaign, Democrats criticized the
bills only doctrine because they saw it as an obstacle to lower long-term
rates, thought to be capable of stimulating spending. 130 Nudged by Presi-
dent Kennedy, the Fed began to invest in longer-term Treasury securi-
ties.'13 The theory was that the Fed could directly influence long-term
interest rates as well as short-term ones, a policy to which we have re-
turned today. 32 Called Operation Twist after the dance of its day, it
would consist of the Fed extending the term of its Treasury portfolio by
selling short-term securities and buying long-term ones. 1
33
One of the more controversial decisions of the Fed during this peri-
od was to start dealing in foreign exchange. 34 Again, the push for this
came from the Kennedy Administration.' 35 The Fed disagreed internally
about whether it had authority for these trades, with some preferring that
Congress pass enabling legislation to do so.' 36 By a majority vote of the
125.2 MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 299.
126. 1 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 744.
127. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 35 ("To free itself from pressures to support the market for
long-term debt, the Federal Reserve adopted a bills-only policy."); see also id. at 59 (describing the
terms of thc FOMC's unanimous vote in favor of the bills only policy).
128. By affecting the amount of liquidity that dealers could get through repurchase agreements,
the Fed's actions in the short-term money market would have an indirect influence on the price of
long-term assets. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 102.
129. Id. at 54 ("Thenceforth the Fed would maintain orderly conditions at the short end, and
rely on arbitrage and private dealers to bring orderly conditions to the long end.").
130. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 315-16.
131. Id. at 316.
132. Id. at 317 (discussing Heller's memorandum to Kennedy asserting that the Fed could
influence long term rates).
133. Titan Alon & Eric Swanson, Operation Twist and the Effect of Large-Scale Asset Pur-
chases, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO ECONOMIC LETTER (2011) (comparing the
original Operation Twist with quantitative easing).
134. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 348-58.
135. Id. at 348 (citing objections of Congressmen Reuss, Multer, and Patman).
136. Id. at 350.
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Board, though, the Fed decided to authorize these foreign currency trades
under its authorities to buy cable transfers, which involve claims to for-
eign exchange.' 3 7 Nevertheless, several congressmen accused the Fed of
exceeding its statutory authorities.'
38
In 1966, Congress further expanded the Fed's authority over open-
market operations by letting it buy and sell the direct obligations of any
government agency.' 39 The same year, the FOMC adopted a trading mo-
dality that would become a stable transaction-reverse repurchase
agreements.14  These agreements let the Fed absorb banks' excess re-
serves by entering into short-term loans collateralized by Treasury debt
from the Fed's portfolio.141 Fed staff objected that because this amounted
to a cash loan by a bank to the Fed, it might not be legal, and it might
cast doubt about the Fed's own solvency. 42 In the end, the FOMC ap-
proved the technique, which has gone on to become a staple of the Fed's
market-making activities. 143
Skirmishes continued between the Fed and the political branches.
44
To not overstate my argument, let me note that Congress narrowed the
Fed's freedom of action at least once: the Federal Reserve Reform Act of
137. Id. at 352 (citing objections of Congressmen Rcuss, Multer, and Patman); id. at 349.
138. Id. at 348 (citing objections of Congressmen Reuss, Multer, and Patman).
139. Id. at 661.
140. Id. at 464. In an ordinary repurchase transaction, the Fed made liquidity available to a
bank by buying some of its Treasury securities and simultaneously entering into a future sale of
those same securities back to the bank. By adjusting the original purchase price and repurchase
price, the Fed could arrive at a notional rate of interest to be paid by the bank. A reverse repo fol-
lowed the same mechanics but served the opposite policy of provisionally shifting some liquidity
from the private banking system onto the Fed's balance sheet. Id. at 464. Again, the price difference
between the two offsetting trades would establish a notional rate of interest, but this time it would be
on a hypothetical loan from the bank to the Fed. Id.
141. PARKER B. WILLIS, THE FEDERAL FUNDS MARKET: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 27
(1970) (describing use of"matched sale-purchase-contract" to absorb bank reserves).
142. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 464.
143. Indeed, reverse repurchase agreements are one of the main ways that the Fed may use to
pull back drain inflationary liquidity. Deborah Levine, Fed Says Testing Reverse Repos for Future
Use, MARKET WATCH (Oct. 19, 2009) (noting that Fed officials have discussed using reverse repo to
offset monetary easing).
144. In 1978, Jimmy Carter coaxed William Miller out of the chairmanship position after only
one year by making him Secretary of the Treasury. TODD, supra note 66, at 40-41. In 1988, Alan
Greenspan complained before Congress about a Reagan official's attempt to influence the delibera-
tions of the FOMC. See TODD, supra note 84, at 3; see also Art Pine, Greenspan Discloses Attempt
to Prod Fed to Ease Policy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1988. In 1986, Senator John Melcher unsuccessful-
ly sued the Fed in district court arguing that appointing presidents of the regional Federal Reserve
banks without congressional approval violated the Constitution. TODD, supra note 66, at 47-48. In
1988, another Texas congressman, Henry Gonzalez, used his chairmanship of the House Banking
Committee to urge the Fed to disclose more about what it does. id. at 49-50. Rep. Lee Hamilton
introduced a bill in 1989 to put the Secretary of the Treasury on the Fed Board again. Id. at 49. In
1991, Senator Paul Sarbanes proposed a bill that would have kept the presidents of the regional
Federal Reserve banks from voting on the FOMC. Id.
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1977 required the Fed to report to Congress on a variety of policy mat-
ters. 145 The trend line is clear though-alluvial growth of trading authori-
ty by statutory enactment and expansive statutory construction by the
Fed. For example, in 1980 Congress gave the Fed authority to conduct
open-market operations with foreign public debt.1
46
A particularly important expansion of the Fed's emergency liquidi-
ty powers came in 1991. That year, Congress reformed the federal gov-
ernment's mechanism for resolving failed and failing banks with the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 147 The goal was to limit the federal gov-
ernment's exposure to financial risk from failing banks, sometimes mag-
nified by discount window lending. 48 When it came to the Fed's emer-
gency powers under section 13(3), however, the statute went in the oppo-
site direction by expanding the kind of collateral that the Fed could ac-
cept. 149 It would presage the emergency liquidity efforts of 2008.
Since the Fed's founding, nonbank firms had had little practical ac-
cess to the Fed's emergency credit because they tended not to have the
kinds of assets that qualified as eligible collateral, first for the discount
window and then for emergency lending under section 13(3). Much as
the Panic of 1907 had encouraged Congress to revisit the issue of a cen-
tral bank, the stock market crash of October 1987 persuaded Congress
that the Fed's emergency liquidity powers should be broadened so that it
could lend to a wider set of actors that could pledge different kinds of
collateral. 50 Although not framed in so many words, this was an implicit
recognition of an incipient shadow banking sector.
Congress accomplished this objective by striking the language in
section 13(3) that had limited collateral to the kinds of assets that were
already eligible for discount.' 5' The practical effect of this change was to
145. Emerson, supra note 17, at note 49 (conceding that the Federal Reserve Reform Act is a
rare exception to the trend of expansion of authoritics).
146. Depository Institutions Deregulations and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221.
147. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102242,
105 Stat. 2236; see also M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RES. SERV., FDIC IMPROVEMENT ACT OF
1991 (PUB. L. 102242): A SUMMARY (1992).
148. Walker F. Todd, FDICIA 's Discount Window Provisions, ECON. COMMENT., Dec. 15,
1992, at 16 ("Congress felt compelled to address discount window administration in FDICIA be-
cause of its concern that, under certain circumstances, discount window advances to troubled institu-
tions could unnecessarily increase taxpayers" cost when the firms were eventually closed and liqui-
dated, or sold by the FDIC.").
149. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 473; see also Todd,
supra note 105, at 16-23.
150. Todd, supra note 105, at 22 (noting legislative history of collateral expansion).
151. What this means is that "FDICIA expanded emergency discount window access for non-
banks of all types, not merely securities firms, because any satisfactory assets (not just marketable
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allow nonbank lenders and other kinds of entities to borrow under sec-
tion 13(3), making this the Fed's most expansive permanent discount.
This authority would lay dormant until used to help Bear Steams (an in-
vestment bank) in 2008. Ironically, the sponsor of the 1991 collateral
expansion was Senator Christopher Dodd, later responsible for the
Dodd-Frank Act, which would go on to abridge this authority.
15 2
Congress increased the Fed's emergency lending authority again af-
ter September 11, 2001. Since its enactment during the Depression, the
authority under section 13(3) had required a majority vote based on a
quorum of five Fed Governors. Aware that some crises called for agility,
Congress in 2002 lowered the quorum from five to two and required that
all available Governors agree unanimously on the need for this kind of
authority.153 In this situation, a written determination by the participating
Governors would be needed, later transmitted to the Chairmen of the
Senate Committee on Banking and the House Committee on Financial
Services.1
54
When archeologist Heinrich Schliemann excavated Troy, what he
found was seven different cities, one on top of each other. 5 5 The Fed's
roles were similarly layered-it was at first a banker's bank, and then a
market maker, and finally it became a trustee for Congress's impossible
expectations imposed in a mixed mandate over both inflation and em-
ployment. Market exigencies were about to create a new Fed.
securities, for example) may be pledged to secure the borrower's own note." Todd, supra note 148,
at 18.
152. Todd, supra note 105, at 20 (1993) (quoting Sen. Dodd from the Congressional Record).
153. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 301, 116 Stat. 2340
(amending the Federal Reserve Act and adding § 1 (r), 12 U.S.C. §248(r)). That same year, the Fed
also adopted a regulation clarifying how credit under section 13(3) was to be extended:
Emergency credit for others. In unusual and exigent circumstances and after consultation
with the Board of Govemors, a Federal Reserve Bank may extend credit to an individual,
partnership, or corporation that is not a depository institution if, in the judgment of the
Federal Reserve Bank, credit is not available from other sources and failure to obtain
such credit would adversely affect the economy. If the collateral used to secure emergen-
cy credit consists of assets other than obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to principal
and interest by, the United States or an agency thereof, credit must be in the form of a
discount and five or more members of the Board of Governors must affirmatively vote to
authorize the discount prior to the extension of credit. Emergency credit will be extended
at a rate above the highest rate in effect for advances to depository institutions.
67 Fed. Reg. 67,786 (Nov. 7, 2002).
154. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 301.
155. SUSAN HEUCK ALLEN, FINDING THE WALLS OF TROY: FRANK CALVERT AND HEINRICH
SCHLIEMANN AT HISARLiK 147 (1999).
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III. FINANCIAL HOSPITALS: AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE FED
As the opening hypothetical from Part I shows, lenders are ex-
pected to borrow short and lend long. 56 This works so long as funding
markets let them refinance. From the perspective of stewarding funding
markets, the crisis became acute when lenders could not roll over their
short-term debt. This was when the Fed morphed into a market maker of
last resort. 157 Section A sets up the crisis by explaining how the rise of
new funding products and nonbank lenders had changed the Fed's theater
of operations. Since the Fed's establishment, a shift had occurred to-
wards "capital market-based finance" and away from traditional lenders
like banks.158 This was not entirely a surprise, after all, because Con-
gress's expansion in 1991 of collateral eligibility for section 13(3) had
nodded to these trends.
Accordingly, between March and December 2008, the Fed expand-
ed its secured lending to nonbank firms and funding vehicles, which
were allowed to post a wide range of collateral.159 The expansion operat-
ed on two liquidity tracks-limited-liability companies linked to particu-
lar firms, and programs that directed support to particular asset classes or
intermediaries. Section B examines the limited-liability companies,
called "Maiden Lane" after the street address of the NYFRB. Section C
examines the programs.
A. Interbank Funding
Beginning late in the twentieth century, funding markets had un-
dergone important changes, with important implications for both the as-
set-side and the liability-side of lender balance sheets. First, on the asset-
side, banks had begun to face competition from nonbank lenders in the
156. "A classic function of banking [is]... increasing the supply of long-term and fixed-rate
credit available to borrowers, which a bank can do by borrowing at shorter terms and at both fixed
and floating terms and then professionally managing the risks of term and rate mismatches on its
balance sheet." Gabilondo, supra note 22, at 265 & n.38.
157. An analysis by the Congressional Research Service lists twenty-six potential causes of the
2007 financial crisis. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RES. SERV., R 40173, CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS (Apr. 9, 2010). The Fed has direct or indirect responsibility for half of them, e.g., housing
bubble, shadow banking, failure of bank risk management systems, Community Reinvestment Act,
and systemic risk. Id. at 5- 10.
158. State Street, Securities Lending, Liquidity, and Capital Market-Based Finance, in
SECURITIES FINANCE: SECURITIES LENDING AND REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS 40 (Frank J. Fabozzi
and Steven V. Mann eds., 2005) ("Capital markets in [the United States and the United Kingdom]
have, in fact, replaced banks as the dominant source of corporate finance.").
159. See, e.g., Isabella Kaminska, A Tale of Two Collateral Markets, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2011), http://ftalphavillc.fl.com/blog/2011/12/19/79321 I/a-tale-of-two-collateral-markcts/.
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"shadow banking" sector.160 These shadow banks included securities
firms, hedge funds, money market mutual funds, and special purpose
vehicles designed to raise funds. 16' Bank-dominated lending had given
way to markets in which banks, nonbank financial institutions, and other
firms originated and traded credit. Not subject to regulation as depository
institutions, these nonbank firms lacked access to the Fed's last resort
funding.
Second, the funding model for lenders-addressing the liability-
side of the balance sheet-had changed. Demand deposits-a traditional
source of lendable funds--decreased as customers moved their funds
into other types of financial institutions. 162 Around 1961, commercial
163Asproftibanks had begun to issue large certificates of deposit. 6 As part of this
process, banks looked for substitute funding not only from securitization
but also from other wholesale lenders and financial markets. 164 In effect,
both depository institutions and other lenders had adopted a new funding
model to serve their traditional roles.
For example, money market mutual funds had become the single
largest investor of commercial paper, used by firms to finance their
short-term credit needs. 165 Often this meant using a limited-liability com-
pany. For example, a company set up to issue asset-backed commercial
paper would issue short-term commercial paper collateralized by asset-
backed securities created from long-term mortgages. 166 This arrangement
solved the classic funding challenge faced by lenders of borrowing short
(through commercial paper) and lending long (through the underlying
mortgages), but it worked only if the commercial paper could be re-
financed upon maturity at the same interest rate.
160. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 21, at I ("Over the past decade, the shadow banking system
provided sources of funding for credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like,
short-term liabilities.").
161. Id.
162. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, LIQUIDITY: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 1-2 (2012)
(discussing risk implications to banks of shrinking deposit base).
163. Rob J.M. Willemse, Large Certificates of Deposit, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY
MARKET, supra note 56, at 39.
164. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LISSA LAMKIN BROOME,
SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS 1-3 (2004) (tracing the growth of
securitization from the 1970s).
165. Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility, FRBNY ECON.
POL'Y REV., May 2011, at 25, 28, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/
I Ivl7n 1/1 105adri.pdf; see also Timothy Q. Cook & Jeremy G. Duffield, Money Market Mutual
Funds and Other Short-Term Investment Pools, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra
note 56, at 156, 157 (discussing the growth of money market mutual funds since 1972).
166. Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 26.
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Funding came to be understood as an "interbank" phenomenon,
with new opportunities and risks. 167 In the old world of a deposit-funded
loan held to maturity, a liquidity panic would have started when deposi-
tors made a run on a bank's deposits. 68 Federal deposit insurance miti-
gated the risk of a panic, but in the unlikely event of one nonetheless the
lender-of-last-resort function would come into play; the solvent but illiq-
uid bank could borrow from the Fed on eligible collateral until the panic
passed. In a world of nonbank lenders and fickle trading markets, though,
stabilizing a run was more complicated. 69 One wholesale lender's risk
assessment of a borrower could cause a panic if other lenders followed
Suit.170 Moreover, the secondary market for credit made it easy for price
signals to travel anonymously and quickly. So it was not enough to wor-
ry about a firm's liquidity-the whole markets mattered now.
As suggested by Part I, lender funding had been the Fed's problem
since its establishment.' 7' Not only did these markets promote bank li-
quidity, they were also where the Fed pursued monetary policy, expect-
ing that changing bank reserves would influence the credit supply and
longer-term interest rates.1 72 In particular, the Fed had stewarded the
money market. 7 3 This included participating in markets for commercial
paper, 7 4 bankers' acceptances, 75 and the call-loan market, where inves-
167. Not surprisingly, new risk management products developed. In 1968, short-term interest-
rate futures entered the market. Anatoli Kuprianov, Short-Term Interest Rate Futures, in
INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note 56, at 168-69. The following year, options on
short-term interest rate futures followed. Id. at 193-206.
168. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo I (Yale Int'l
Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper 09-14, Nov. 9, 2010) ("A traditional-banking run is driven by the with-
drawal of deposits, while a securitized-banking run is driven by the withdrawal of repurchase ("re-
po") agreements.").
169. These were the risks that the last crisis put on display:
A bank's reliance on the financial markets for funding, however, can also increase the
level, uncertainty, and complexity of a bank's liquidity risk profile ... funding from fi-
nancial markets also exposes a bank to heightened systemic liquidity risk [due to] the
volatility of global and domestic funds supply and demand, unexpected disruptions in
normal market trading and pricing, settlement and operational interruptions, and pro-
nounced adjustments in a market's risk pricing and acceptance.
Id. at 18.
170. Id. (arguing that "securitized banking" funded by repurchase agreements came to substi-
tute for "traditional banking" funded by deposits).
17 1. See supra notes 78-83, 94-102.
172. Craig Furfine, The Interbank Market During a Crisis I (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Work-
ing Paper No. 99, 2001) ("[l~t is in [interbank] markets that central banks actively intervene to guide
their policy interest rates.").
173. Historically, we divide financial markets into a money market with instruments of one
year or less and a capital market with instruments of longer than one year. See generally
INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note 56.
174. David L. Menglc, The Discount Window, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET,
supra note 56, at 23, 31.
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tors borrowed money from stock brokers to purchase stock on margin.176
When the Treasury began offering short-term Treasury bills in 1929, the
Fed's open-market operations supported their liquidity. 177 The Fed also
supported self-sustaining money markets where banks could fund them-
selves. One example was the federal funds market, a trading mechanism
that let banks with excess reserves sell them to banks in need of re-
serves. 178
The Fed had also contributed to the repurchase (repo) sector, which
would assume primordial importance in the interbank funding model.
179
During the 1950s, private dealers had begun financing their inventories
of Treasury debt through repo agreements in which the seller of the secu-
rity promised to buy it back. 180 Though structured as back-to-back pur-
chases, these transactions were, in effect, secured loans using Treasury
debt as collateral. Repo let firms get cheap credit by pledging Treasuries
as collateral for short-term cash loans, reducing both the firm's cost of
holding Treasuries and the federal government's cost of issuing them.' 8'
The borrowed cash could be profitably reinvested before repayment.
175. Eric Hill, Bankers Acceptances, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note 56,
at 126, 132.
176. Both the U.S. government and foreign governments began to borrow heavily during
World War I, however, making it harder for brokers to fund their margin loans to customers. 2
MARKHAM, supra note 37, at 80. To respond to the concern that shortages of short-term call money
would disrupt both the stock market and the Treasury's own market for government securities, a
Money Committee was formed with the FRBNY chief and New York banking officials. Id. at 80-81.
The Committee dissolved itself after two years, but it presaged the Fed's future role in regulating
margin credit. Id. Margin credit contributed importantly to the speculation leading to the Great
Crash. See id. at 150 (noting that banks could borrow from the Fed at 3.5% and relend in the call
money market at 10%).
177. Timothy Q. Cook, Treasury Bills, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note
56, at 81; see also Garbade, supra note 6.
178. WILLIS, supra note 141, at 4. Before its rise, banks short of cash could finance their re-
serve requirement through the Fed's discount window, but banks wanted other ways to manage their
reserves. Some banks had excess reserves looking for investment. In the early 1920s, banks realized
that they could trade these excess reserves, giving banks short on reserves an option to the discount
window. Id. Initially, the Fed did not encourage the funds market because it deprived the Fed of
information about the financial condition of banks, as reflected in the factors that influence their
reserve position. Id. at 5. The market took off nonetheless. It would become one of the central ways
that the Fed conducted monetary policy.
179. Stephen A. Lumpkin, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements, in INSTRUMENTS
OF THE MONEY MARKET, supra note 56, at 65, 73-74.
180. WILLIS, supra note 141, at 22-24.
181. Formally, the deal includes a pair of offsetting contracts-for example, a spot agreement
to sell a security matched by a forward agreement to buy back the security. It is in substance a col-
lateralized loan.
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.Broker-dealers relied on this kind of overnight funding more than com-
mercial banks did.1
82
Developments in repo were symptomatic of what was happening in
the funding market in general. A repo bubble had developed, as the mar-
ket increased seven-fold since 1994.183 Although repo had tended to be
confined to government securities, collateral markets now developed for
repoing other kinds of assets too.' 84 Moreover, the percentage of over-
night deals had increased, shortening the average term of these deals. 85
These developments had weakened the Fed's grip on its policy role
because funding was taking place in markets in which the Fed neither
discounted nor traded. Though the locus of funding had changed, it still
mattered for the same reasons. For example, the imminence of funding
transactions made them important as liquidity signals-if a firm could
not pay its overnight debt, its long-term solvency was in peril. 86 Price
moves in interbank deals could also first reflect more permanent differ-
ences in the trading value of credit assets. 8 7 It was a critical node, then,
one that could send early warnings about the financial sector. Because it
involves direct financial links (both on and off the balance sheet) be-
tween financial firms, it could signal systemic risk. 88 So it was natural
that the Fed would take an interest in the growing influence of interbank
mechanisms.
182. See Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve's Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 15 CURRENT
ISSUES ECON. & FIN., no. 4, 2009, at 1-10, 2 (finding that repo deals for 2007 made up 38% of the
short-term liabilities of broker-dealcrs but only 10% of those for commercial banks).
183. Id. at 2 (noting that the market increased from $450 billion to $3 trillion).
184. See Adrian et al., supra note 182, at 2 (noting a variety of financial instruments financed
by repurchase arrangements).
185. See id. at 3 (noting that the proportion of overnight deals increased from 50% to 7 5 % of
overall market).
186. As Perry Mehrling points out:
It is in the daily operation of the money market that the coherence of the credit system,
that vast web of promises to pay, is tested and resolved as cash flows meet cash commit-
ments. The web of interlocking debt commitments, each one a more or less rash promise
about an uncertain future, is like a bridge that we collectively spin out into the unknown
future towards shores not yet visible.
MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 3-4.
187. Even small changes in the estimates of this risk-as measured by the terms that overnight
lenders impose-may be significant indicators of how the market is seeing an instrument's long-
term prospects.
188. Christian Upper, Using Counterfaetual Simulations to Assess the Danger of Contagion in
Interbank Markets (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 234, 2007) (examining the role of
interbank links in spreading financial contagion). Risk can be expressed in terms of the proportion of
a bank's assets that consist of loans to other banks. Id. at 2. Bank regulators pay special attention to
accounts that banks have with other banks. See also COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK ON DUE FROM BANKS (1998) (providing analysis and examination
procedures for bank deposits in other banks).
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The scope of the interbank market, however, was no longer clear.189
In its narrowest sense, it meant only credit exposures between federally
insured depository institutions, namely, banks. 90 It could also include the
discount window, federal funds, and repurchase agreements. 19'
Given the rise of nonbank lenders and funding vehicles, we should
define the interbank sector broadly, capturing any mechanism used to
shift or transfer short-term credit risk between financial firms. 192 This
would incorporate the trader's sense that the interbank sector refers to a
variety of secured and unsecured credit-both term and overnight-used
by financial firms other than depositary institutions. 93 A broad definition
would also include swaps, options, futures, and money market mutual
funds insofar as they relate to the debt of a lender. 194 As academics
189. A broader definition makes sense because it is not clear anymore what counts as a "bank."
It is not only banks that intermediate maturity but also other firms and financing vehicles. This idea
draws on John Maynard Keynes's notion from the 1930s about the priority of the financial sector,
Hyman Minsky's work from the 1980s on financial instability, and Ben Bcmanke's efforts to study
the "financial accelerator." See Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 447; see also supra notes 125-39.
Bernanke is widely understood to favor central bank support during a credit crisis, but this idea rests
largely on the premise that the financial sector is a crucial part of the economy, an insight not appre-
ciated during the Depression. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 44.
190. See 12 C.F.R. § 206 (2003). Sometimes even more narrowly it refers to unsecured lending
between banks. Joao F. Cocco et al., Lending Relationships in the Interbank Market, 18 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 24 (2007), available at http://faculty.london.edu/fgomes/cgmart.pdf.
191. Repurchase agreements also provide central banks with a mechanism to influence the
credit supply and with information about major financial institutions. COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN.
SYS. OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE GRP. OF TEN COUNTRIES, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
PUB. NO. 10, IMPLICATIONS OF REPO MARKETS FOR CENTRAL BANKS I (1999) ("Repos are useful to
central banks both as a monetary policy instrument and as a source of information on market expec-
tations.").
192. You can see securitization as a way of externalizing what would otherwise count as inter-
bank claims, say through whole-loan exposures to other financial intermediaries. A functional dcfini-
tion of interbank funding should, therefore, recognize the economic similarity between an explicit
interbank asset (like a loan to another financial firm) and a bank's ongoing exposure to sceuritized
assets that can morph into de facto interbank assets. Take the purchaser of an asset-backed tranche
from a special-purpose vehicle. Assuming that a true sale has occurred, the purchaser has no ongoing
relationship to the vehicle's sponsor or the originator of the receivables purchased by the vehicle.
But if the purchaser later ends up with a claim against the sponsor or originator through moral re-
course or to a third party that has provided some kind of liquidity backing, then some new de facto
interbank relationships have been created from the purchaser to these other parties. This might hap-
pen if the bank is providing a liquidity guarantee to an asset-backed commercial paper conduit or a
structured-investment vehicle, both of which proliferated during the bubble. Xavier Freixas, Antoine
Martin & David Skele, Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets, and Monetary Policy (Eur. Banking Ctr.
Discussion, Working Paper No. 2010-08S, 2010) (pointing out the contingent liquidity risk of banks
that had issued liquidity guarantees).
193. In Europe, the Wholesale Markets Brokers Associations promotes indices to track inter-
bank lending. See WHOLESALE MARKETS BROKERS' ASS'N, http://www.wmba.org.uk/pages/in
dex.cfm (last visited July 4, 2012).
194. See Felix Salmon, Money Markets Are the New Interbank Markets, REUTERS BLOG (June
27, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/fclix-salmon/20I2/06/27/moncy-markets-are-thc-new-interbank-
markets/. For example, rates on the overnight indexed swap (OIS) arc often used as a benchmark to
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mulled over these admittedly intriguing questions, the Fed was beginning
to face the prospect of major organ failure in the financial system.195 In
the end, the Fed would sweep up new sectors of the interbank market
through the financial hospitals analyzed in sections B and C.
The liquidity predicate for the crisis had started during the Green-
span years, when loose money fed a credit bubble. 196 This would begin to
change in July 2007 as indicators suggested rising credit risk. 197 Worsen-
ing during the summer, that August a French bank stopped redeeming
some of its funds after concluding that it could not value some securities
backed up by U.S. subprime mortgages. 98 Soon the overnight rate that
London banks paid for uncollateralized funds-the London Inter-Bank
Offer Rate (LIBOR)--began to increase, rising substantially in compari-
son with its U.S. cousin, the federal funds rate.' 99 Borrowers in the
LIBOR market are viewed as having sterling credit, so it was noteworthy
when the market expressed increasing concern about these borrowers'
creditworthiness.2 °°
evaluate rates on repo deals. H6rdahl & King, supra note 35, at 42. The OIS contract is a variation of
the "vanilla" fixed-for-floating swap. A fixed-rate payer receives the average of overnight rates
during the term of the swap. Id. at 37. Net settlement happens at the end of the swap. Id.
195. These are economic models that evolve based on new economic theory. Mark
Whitehouse, Crisis Compels Economists to Reach for New Paradigm, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2009, at
I (examining Yale economist John Geanakoplos's work on how collateral markets impact leverage
cycles). Central bank researchers have already begun to consider this issue. For example, in 2001,
the Bank for International Settlements published a study examining the role of central banks in col-
lateral markets. WORKING GRP. ON COLLATERAL, COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., BANK FOR
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PUB. NO. 17, COLLATERAL IN WHOLESALE FINANCIAL MARKETS: RECENT
TRENDS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND MARKET DYNAMICS (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/cgfs I 7.htm. The study was precipitated by the fear-ironic today-that budget surpluses in the
United States and other borrower nations would lead to a shortage in government debt collateral. Id.
at 12. The report noted that central banks had little effect on the private collateral market because
central bank lending was small relative to the overall debt market, although private parties might
prefer to hold collateral deemed by a central bank to be eligible for secured lending by it. Id. at 17.
196. Alan Greenspan served as chair of the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006. At the time, he
was seen as having contributed to great prosperity, although, in hindsight, some see many of the
economic gains from that time as illusory. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 50-66. Initially, Bernanke kept
Greenspan's monetary policies. Id. at 84 ("Greenspan had been steadily raising the Fed's key interest
rate for years; Bernanke continued to do so and indeed left many of his predecessor's monetary
policies untouched.") The stock market would keep rising until October 2007, when the Dow Jones
Industrial Average broke 14,000 for the first time. Id. at 92.
197. Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Response: The Federal Reserve in the Early Stages of
the Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 5 I, 57 (2009) (noting that spreads on certain credit
products had begun to widen).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 57-59 (noting that usual ten basis point spread between LIBOR and Fed funds wid-
ened to between 25 and 106 basis points through the fall of 2007).
200. The LIBOR was rocked by its first major scandal in July 2012 when Barclay's admitted
that it had deliberately underestimated its borrowing costs.
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By mid-2007, the repo sector began to show signs of these stress-
20 0
es. Lenders had become willing to make only shorter term loans.2°2
This meant that borrowers had to refinance more frequently. 203 Corporate
debt and structured finance products could no longer be financed by repo
as lenders sought higher quality collateral.2°4 Moreover, an increasing
number of lenders were refusing to return their collateral, meaning that
the second leg of the paired transaction-the original purchase and the
subsequent repurchase-did not occur, leading to settlement failures.20 5
Banks could borrow longer than overnight, but only with collateral,
which increased demand for Treasury securities.20 6 By March 2008, the
par value outstanding of securities that were being used as collateral
shrank from $4.5 trillion to $2.5 trillion.20 7 These were unsettling trends.
This time, the challenge facing the Fed-too much integration of
financial markets-was the opposite of the fragmented commercial paper
market from the previous century. 20 8 Textbook Bagehot, the Fed went
into the lender-of-last-resort mode, opening the liquidity floodgates to
banks with traditional collateral eligible for emergency lending. The Fed
started with its traditional tools-lowering the discount rate and the fed-
eral-funds target.20 9 Cutting the discount rate by 0.5%-a large move-
temporarily reduced pressure. 210 This rate would eventually drop from
5.25% in August 2007 to zero, leaving the Fed with none of its tradition-
al options for increasing the credit supply.
211
The Fed also made it easier for banks to get traditional funding by
extending the term of discount window lending and letting banks pledge
a wider range of collateral. 2  It was a cautious step towards acting as a
201. Cecchetti, supra note 197, at 51-75, 61-62 (noting that the repo rate fell).
202. Hordahl & King, supra note 35, at 37 ("Despite the presence of collateral, repo markets
were quickly affected by the turmoil ... repo transactions were increasingly restricted to short ma-
turities and against only the highest-quality securities.").
203. Id. at 43.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 37, 46.
206. Krishna Guha, Fed's Eyes Foray into Unsecured Loans, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008 (analyz-
ing Fed's options in the nonbank interbank market).
207. See Adrian et al., supra note 182, at 2.
208. See id at 5.
209. Johnson, supra note 1, at 7; see supra note 14 (discussing the six major activities that
Johnson identifies).
210. Saskia Scholtes & Joanna Chung, Many Question Fed's Move, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007
("Initial reactions to these cuts have been positive, say traders, but they caution that conditions re-
main far from normal.").
211. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 242-47 (describing the dilemma caused in a zero interest rate
policy-"ZIRP"--cnvironment).
212. The Term Discount Window Program and the Term Auction Facility extended the term of
some discount window lending and broadened the kinds of securities that commercial banks could
post as collateral for loans. Johnson, supra note I, at 10-11; Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal
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market maker of last resort, but it only benefitted banks-the Fed's tradi-
tional liquidity clients.213 More radical steps would be needed to reach
the shadow-banking sector, whose exact dimensions-hazy during the
bubble-would emerge more clearly during the crash one deal at a time.
The Fed was confronting the regulatory gap that had led to the 1991 re-
laxation of collateral requirements for emergency lending: markets
would also have to be made on behalf of nonbank firms holding unortho-
dox collateral. Luckily, section 13(3) and its serial liberalization had put
the Fed in a position to address this gap more actively than it had during
the Depression. 14 As a Fed governor quipped, "[t]he script was rewritten
so that product innovation flowed, but this time from the public authori-
ties.
B. Inpatient
Using section 13(3), the Fed established three limited-liability
companies to make a market for structured finance assets that had be-
come stranded on the balance sheets of Bear Steams and AIG, two non-
bank firms. Once established, the Fed started trading out of its position.
By June 2012, the Fed had been repaid in full with interest for all of its
loans to these entities.21 6 Although consolidated on to the Fed's balance
sheet, each company was separately capitalized, so I discuss each in
turn.
2 17
1. Maiden Lane I (Repurchase Markets)
The first major sign (to financial markets and, indeed, to itself) that
the Fed was broadening its market-making role was the deal done for
Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Measures Designed to Address Elevated Pressures in
Short-Term Funding Markets (Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://www.fcdcralreserve.gov/monct
arypolicy/20071212a.htm. Short-term rates did lower after the announcement of the TAF and other
measures, although it is not clear how much the TAF had to do with it. David C. Wheelock, Another
Window: The Term Auction Facility, MONETARY TRENDS (Mar. 2008), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/ mt/20080301/cover.pdf.
213. Krishna Guha, Fed to Overhaul Provision of Market Liquidity, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007
(noting the goal of the programs was "making dollar liquidity more readily available in both the
onshore and offshore funding markets"); Krishna Guha, Fed Moves to Ensure There Is Enough for
the New Year, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007 (noting year-end demand of banks for liquidity).
214. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 40 ("The institution was still in its adolescence when it con-
fronted and failed its biggest test: misstep after misstep on the Fed's part turned a bad late-1920s
recession into the Great Depression.").
215. Warsh, supra note 26.
216. Press Release, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., New York Fed Announces Full Repayment of its
Loans to Maiden Lane LLC and Maiden Lane Ill LLC (June 14, 2012) (on file with author).
217. The Fed includes financial information about the Maiden Lane transactions in its weekly
release of its own financial condition. H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FED. RES.,
http://www.federalrescrve.gov/rclcascs/ h4l/current/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
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Bear Steams, an investment bank beyond the charmed circle of the Fed's
liquidity clients.21 8 Bear's financial problems had started in a sector that
had attracted relatively little attention before the crisis-the repo market.
Borrowing short and investing long during the repo bubble, Bear had
been acting like a commercial bank, with one key difference-it lacked
the liquidity safety net provided by the federal government to encourage
banks to mismatch their assets and liabilities. 219 For Bear, the music
stopped in March 2008, when its secured-repo lenders refused to roll
over their overnight loans.22°
It was now that the Fed turned to section 13(3). Because Congress
had steadily broadened the kinds of collateral and firms that qualified for
emergency assistance and relaxed the quorum requirement for action, the
Board was able to act quickly.
2 2 1
To that end, it established a limited-liability company, Maiden
Lane.222 The Fed lent to the vehicle, which purchased assets associated
with Bear Steams' mortgage unit. Half of these assets were mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) guaranteed by government-sponsored enti-
ties. 223 The other assets included whole mortgage loans (both commercial
and residential) that were performing at the time of the purchase.224 The
vehicle also bought swaps and forward contracts related to Bear's mort-
gage business. 225 By keeping Bear viable, Maiden Lane obviated the
need for Bear's collateralized lenders to sell their collateral, which would
have further depressed prices in the interbank market.
226
218. In 1982, Federal Reserve official Jerry Corrigan identified three functional features that
made banks "special," in the sense that they justified their unique access to liquidity support from
the government. E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in FED (1983), available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publicationspapcrs/pubdisplay.cfm?id=68 4 . These three features
were that banks provide transaction accounts for consumers and firms, that they stand ready to pro-
vide backup liquidity in moments of market crisis, and that the Federal Reserve uses the banks for
monetary policy. Disintermediation away from depository institutions made other firms "special"
too.
219. See Gabilondo, supra note 22, at 265-66 (adding maturity mismatch as an element to
Jerry Corrigan's model of what made banks special).
220. See Gabilondo, supra note 9; supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
22 1. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
222. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has established a website with comprehensive
information about these transactions. Maiden Lane Transaction, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y.,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidcnlane.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2012)
223. These MBS amounted to about $13 billion. Press Release, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Sum-
mary of Terms and Conditions Regarding the JPMorgan Chase Facility (Mar. 24, 2008).
224. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Annex II Portfolio Overview (itemizing composition of Maiden
Lane), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/ncwsevents/speechcs/2008/Anncxll.html.
225. Id. All the investment-grade securities were rated BBB- or higher by at least one of the
major credit rating agencies. Id.
226. This is because part of the value of the asset serving as collateral depended on leveraged
liquidity. Gabilondo, supra note 9, at 466-67. A reduction in the leverage that had underwritten
demand for the asset would effectively reduce the value of the asset.
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Although much of the collateral was public, its quality was uneven.
Maiden Lane's audited financial statements for 2008 (its first year) do
not specify whether any of these were sub-investment grade assets, but at
the time, at least 3% of the fair value of the securities had ratings no
higher than BB+, which is the lowest inyestment-grade rating. 227 This
suggests that some of these assets were of relatively low quality. Their
credit quality declined substantially over the life of Maiden Lane, such
that in 2011 over one-half of its fair value was made up of securities rat-
ed no higher than BB+.228
The Fed adhered to the fair-value standards of the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board when establishing its financial hospitals.
229
These standards create a valuation hierarchy for assets, which are catego-
rized into one of three levels based on whether active trading markets
exist for the asset or its proxy.23° A Level 1 asset is one for which there is
an active market that provides directly observable price and quote infor-
227. MAIDEN LANE LLC, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD MARCH
14, 2008 TO DECEMBER 31, 2008 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT 18 (2008), available at
http://www.ncwyorkfcd.org/aboutthefcd/annual/annual08/MaidenLancfinstmt2009.pdf (dividing
type of security by credit rating on March 14, 2008).
228. MAIDEN LANE LLC, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE YEAR
ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2011 AND 2010, AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT 21 (2011), available
at http://www.federalrescrve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/BSTMaidenLaneLLCfinstmt20 Il.pdf.
229. Although generally accepted accounting rules would have required Maiden Lane to report
its value yearly, the Fed began publishing quarterly valuations of Maiden Lane. Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, Annex 1I Portfolio Overview (itemizing composition of Maiden Lane), available
at http://www.newyorkfcd.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/Annexll.html. The following quarter, the
Fed claimed that the value of the portfolio had remained essentially unchanged. See H.4.1 Factors
Affecting Reserve Balances, FED. RES. (July 3, 2008), http://www.federalreservc.gov/releases/
h4l/20080703/; Michael Mackenzie, Fed Values Bear Stearns Assets at $29bn, FIN. SERVICES (July
4, 2008), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/50cf74a6-494c-Ildd-9a5f-000077bO7658.html. In April
2010, the Fed revealed more details about the assets that Maiden Lane had acquired, including their
values and CUSIP number. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed Releases
Additional Information on Maiden Lane Portfolios (Mar. 31, 2010), available at
http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/markets/201 0/ ma 100331 .html; see also Craig Torres, Bob
lvry & Scott Lanman, Fed Reveals Bear Stearns Assets Swallowed to Get JPMorgan to Rescue
Firm, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-01/fed-reveals-bear-
steams-assets-swallowed-to-get-jpmorgan-to-rescue-firm.html. This data was raw rather than very
processed, so analysts and critics began to do their own analysis of the Fed's data disclosure. David
Merkel, Thoughts on Maiden Lane II, ALEPH BLOG (Apr. 4, 2010), http://alephblog.com/
2010/04/04/thoughts-on-maidcn-lane-iii/.
230. See FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT No. 157, FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT:
DETERMINING THE FAIR VALUE OF A FINANCIAL ASSET WHEN THE MARKET FOR THAT ASSET Is
NOT ACTIVE (2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey-id&blobwhere =
175820925446&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtablc=MungoBobs (inter-
preting fair value for inactive markets); see also Tammy Whitehouse, When Bear Steams Rammed
into Fair Value, COMPLIANCE WKLY., Apr. 8, 2008 (noting the difficulty of applying FAS 157 when
trading liquidity dries up); Richard J. Herring, Fair Value Accounting, Disclosure and Financial
Stability: Does How We Keep Score Influence How the Game Is Played? (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 11-72,2011).
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mation.23I A Level 2 asset is one without an active market but with a
proxy market in which price information about a similar asset can be ob-
served directly.232 A Level 3 asset has neither an actual nor a proxy mar-
ket.233 It is priced based on the investor's own assumptions, often using a
proprietary valuation model.
None of the assets purchased by Maiden Lane (the first collateral
deal) had an active market; hence, all of the purchased assets were ini-
tially classified as Level 2 or 3.234 By the end of 2009, however, the trad-
ing markets for many of these assets had increased such that some assets
moved higher up on the valuation hierarchy to Level 1. By 2012, Maiden
Lane had repaid the loan from the Fed in full, although the Fed stands to
make more money after other subordinated investors have been repaid. 235
2. Maiden Lane II (Securities Lending)
As 2008 unfolded, the Fed began to see that Bear was not alone in
terms of collateral problems. The next Maiden Lane responded to AIG,
an insurance company. 236 Insurance companies do not ordinarily suffer
liquidity problems of this type, but AIG began experiencing a serious
liquidity crisis due to its securities lending activities (discussed here) and
its unregulated dealing in credit derivatives (discussed below in the con-
text of Maiden Lane III).237 The firm's liquidity problems had begun to
emerge in 2007 and had worsened in the spring of 2008 after a credit
downgrade.238
In securities lending, AIG would lend out some of its securities, re-
ceive cash collateral, and then invest that collateral in investment-grade
23 1. Herring, supra note 230, at 6
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. MAIDEN LANE LLC, supra note 227.
235. Press Release, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., New York Fed Announces Full Repayment of its
Loans to Maiden Lane LLC and Maiden Lane Ill LLC (June 14, 2012), available at http://www.new
yorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markcts/ 2 012/an 120614.html.
236. For an excellent analysis of the transactional structure of the AIG deal, see William K.
Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009). The article tacitly accepts the
Fed's characterization of its liquidity support for AIG. Id. at 976; see also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-975, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: STATUS OF
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AIG 16 (2009).
237. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE
GOVERNMENT'S EXIT STRATEGY 71 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-
II JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-1 I 1JPRT56698.pdf ("Maiden Lane II (ML2) was set up by FRBNY to
address the liquidity problems AIG was encountering in early November 2008 in its securities lend-
ing program.").
238. See also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 236. One hundred years to the
month after the Knickerbocker Trust crisis of 1907, the AIG crisis led Congress to pass a plan to
support the banking sector by giving the Treasury wide discretion over $700 billion, an appropria-
tion equal to almost 8% of the then-outstanding public debt of the United States.
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assets that were backed by subprime mortgages. 239 As these assets
dropped in value, AIG found that it could not return the cash collateral to
its securities-lending counterparties. After AIG's position became critical
in the fall of 2008, Maiden Lane II paid AIG for the assets that it had
bought with the cash collateral from its securities lending. 240 These assets
24 1were backed by the riskier tranches of mortgage-backed securities.
Maiden Lane II acquired this portfolio at a discount below the par value
of these securities, paying about fifty cents on the dollar.242 With the
money from the sale to Maiden Lane II, AIG could settle its obligations
to its securities-lending counterparties.243
As with the Bear deal, the Fed priced Maiden Lane 1I at fair value,
this time based on a valuation by the investment management company
BlackRock. 24 Although the deal would not close until December, the
date at which fair value was assessed was October 31, 2008.245 Almost
certainly, some of these assets were below investment grade because al-
most 20% of the fair value was made up of securities rated no higher
than BB+. 246 And two-thirds of these were backed by subprime assets.
247
More so than with the first Maiden Lane, the credit quality of these assets
deteriorated quickly and substantially such that one year later less than
25% of the fair value248 was in securities rated more than BB+, and by
2011249 the threshold had dropped to 15%. AIG has since resumed its
securities lending operations.
239. Miles Weiss, AIG to Absorb $5 Billion Loss on Securities Lending (Update 3),
BLOOMBERG, June 27, 2008 (describing how AIG's insurance units had invested cash collateral in
subprime assets). The operations were centralized through AIG Securities Lending Corp.
240. AIG RMBS LLC Facility: Terms and Conditions, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Dec. 16,
2008), http://www.ncwyorkfed.org/markcts/rmbs-tcrms.html.
241. They included ALT ARM and Option ARM products. Maiden Lane II LLC (Non-Agency
RMBS) Asset Composition by Fair Value, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., http://www.ncwyork
fed.org/images/ml/ml2-largel.gif (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
242. Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/mar
kets/maidenlane.html#transactionovervicw2 (last visited Nov. 17, 2012) ("As of October 31, 2008,
the ML 11 LLC portfolio of assets had an estimated fair value of $20.5 billion and a par value of
approximately $39.3 billion.").
243. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 87.
244. MAIDEN LANE I1 LLC, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 31, 2008 TO
DECEMBER 31,2008 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT 8, 11 (2008).
245. Id. at 11.
246. Id. at 15.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 16.
249. Id.
250. Serena Ng & Erik Holm, AIG Is Resuming Securities Loans, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2011.
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3. Maiden Lane III (Credit Default Swaps)
Maiden Lane III also responded to a collateral problem-this time
the issue was that AIG could not honor collateral calls caused by obliga-
tions under credit-default swaps.251 This time the remedy would be to
buy assets from counterparties of AIG with respect to which it had writ-
ten credit-default swaps through the insurance company's financial prod-
ucts unit.252 The assets were collateralized-debt obligations based on
high-grade and mezzanine-grade asset-backed securities, and on com-
mercial real estate. 25 3 These assets consisted of second-generation asset-
backed securities, in other words structured finance that started not with
whole loans but with previously structured financial products, hence
"double-securitized." On November 25, 2008, Maiden Lane III paid for
them by forfeiting cash collateral to these counterparties and offering
additional cash consideration.254
Initially, all of the assets purchased in 2008 by Maiden Lane III
were classified as Level 3 for fair-value accounting. 255 The 2009 audited
financial statements for Maiden Lane III revised the fair value classifica-
tion for 2008 to reflect some Level 1 and Level 2 assets as well1.2 6 Com-
pared with the other Maiden Lanes, this one started out with assets of
lower credit quality, such that almost one-third of its original portfolio
was rated no more than BB+.2 57 Within one year it had deteriorated so
that only 25% of the securities were rated more than BB+. 258 By 2011,
the quality had dropped further, such that only 47% of the securities were
rated more than BB+.259
251. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
SIGTARP-10-003, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES 7
(2009) [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN.], available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/
Audit%2OReports/FactorsAffectingEfforts toLimitPayments toAIG Counterparties.pdf
("[L]iquidity issues resulted largely from its obligation to post collateral in connection with its credit
default swaps.").
252. Essentially, Maiden Lane stepped into AIG's short put position on these swaps by per-
forming on the swaps.
253. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., AIG CDO LLC Facility: Terms and Condi-
tions (Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/aclf_tcrms.html.
254. Id.
255. MAIDEN LANE IIl LLC, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 31, 2008 TO
DECEMBER 31, 2008 AND INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT 11 (2008).
256. Id.
257. MAIDEN LANE IIl LLC, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
2009, AND FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 31, 2008 TO DECEMBER 31, 2008, AND INDEPENDENT
AUDITORS' REPORT 14 (2010).
258. Id. at 17.
259. Maiden Lane Ill LLC, Financial Statements for the Years Ended December 31, 2011 and
2010, and Independent Auditor's Report 19 (Mar. 20, 2012).
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C. Outpatient
The Fed also used section 13(3) to set up five emergency-liquidity
programs that "backstopped the shadow banking system., 260 With one
exception, all of these programs targeted nonbanks, including securities
261firms, corporations, money market mutual funds, and other investors.
The Fed also established a securities-lending facility (based on other au-
thorities) that complemented these emergency-liquidity efforts by letting
firms swap bad collateral for good collateral.262 These programs were
premised on the same financial logic as the Maiden Lane deals: reviving
the interbank-funding market would mean accepting a variety of collat-
eral from nonbank firms. Only this way could the Fed stabilize three key
sectors of the interbank market that had begun to experience interbank
"runs"--repurchase agreements, commercial paper, and money market
mutual funds.263 Used heavily during the worst part of the financial cri-
sis, several of these programs had temporary loan balances of between
$100-350 billion.2 4
At roughly the same time that the Fed created the first Maiden
Lane, the repo market for the Treasury's primary dealers became the ini-
tial focus of these programs. 265 These programs operated like a discount
window for primary dealers, who, like banks, could now borrow against
a wide range of collateral.26 6 Conditions in the repo market got worse
after Lehman's collapse in September 2008, during which the volume of
settlement fails increased thirty-fold compared to conditions before the
260. These were the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, the Asset-Backed Money Market Fund
Liquidity Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, the Money Market Investors Funding
Facility, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. Forms of Federal Reserve Lending,
FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/Forms-of Fed Lending.pdf (last
visited Dec. 1, 2012); see POZSAR ET AL., supra note 21, at 24 ("The Federal Reserve's 13(3) emer-
gency lending facilities that followed in the wake of Lehman's bankruptcy amounted to a backstop
of all the functional steps involved in the shadow credit intermediation process.").
261. The Asset-Backed Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility was open primarily to deposito-
ry institutions, bank holding companies, and U.S. branches of foreign banks.
262. This was the term Securities Lending Facility. Forms of Federal Reserve Lending, supra
note 260.
263. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo (Yale Int'l
Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1440752 (arguing that "securitized banking" funded by repurchase agreements came to
substitute for "traditional banking" funded by deposits). Essentially, this entire market began to face
a run. Because similar runs happened with asset-backed commercial paper, structured-investment
vehicles, and money market mutual funds, we should understand these as runs on interbank funding
generally. Id.; see also The Fed and Libor, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007.
264. Johnson, supra note I, at 29 (listing high balances for the collateral programs).
265. These were the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and the Term Security Lending
Facility (TSLF). Id. at 21-22.
266. See Adrian ct al., supra note 165, at 32.
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crisis.267 In response, the Fed expanded its liquidity support by making
non-investment-grade securities and equities eligible as collateral for
lending. 268 The Fed also let its members swap private mortgage-backed
securities, which lenders no longer wanted to hold as collateral for loans,
for Treasury securities that could still serve as good collateral for repo.269
This help did not come cheaply because the rate was high enough to en-
courage firms to shift to private financing as soon as the market could
provide a better rate. 27 Dealers borrowed extensively from these facili-
ties, which probably had a role in the improvement of the credit ratings
of these dealers.27'
Three other liquidity programs related to commercial paper and
money market mutual funds, market sectors that overlapped somewhat
with each other. The risk premium for investment-grade commercial pa-
272per issued through asset-backed vehicles had been increasing. As a
result, corporations that got short-term financing through commercial
paper were having difficulty placing their paper, even with mutual-
market funds that often invested in high-quality commercial paper.273
The volume of commercial paper shrank by one-third.274 This meant that
issuers of commercial paper had to refinance more often and had to face
rising interest rates.
In response, the Fed set up a dealer facility to support the market by
buying commercial paper.2 75 The facility bought both secured and unse-
cured paper, but the latter was subject to an additional fee to compensate
the Fed for the increased risk.276 To add term to the market (by increasing
the duration of instruments), the facility focused on paper with a maturity
267. Hordahl & King, supra note 35, at 46 (noting increase in September 2008 to nearly $2.7
trillion from $90 billion average during previous two years). At around this time, the Fed extended
the PDCF to offer "transitional credit" to other investment-banking operations. Susan McLaughlin,
The U.S. Tri-Party Repo Market Reforms, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 2 (Oct. 7, 2011),
http://newyorkfed.org/research/confcrenee/201 1/mpworkshop/slides/Mclaughlin.pdf.
268. See Adrian ct al., supra note 165, at 29.
269. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 132.
270. See Sudeep Reddy, As It Starts Programs, Fed Weighs How to Stop Them, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 23, 2009, at A4.
271. See Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 31.
272. Cecchctti, supra note 197, at 60 (noting that the usual spread of five basis points between
asset-backed commercial paper and that of nonfinancial issuers went as high as 150 basis points in
the last quarter of 2007). Traditionally, these vehicles have not been included in the interbank mar-
ket, but I think they belong because often both the borrower and the lender arc financial firms.
273. Johnson, supra note I, at 22. After World War Ii, the commercial paper market had grown
as both financial and other companies turned to it rather than to banks for their short-term borrowing
and lending needs. Rowe, supra note 56, at I 11, 118-19.
274. Cecchetti, supra note 197, at 60 (noting that the commercial paper shrank by one-third-
from $2.2 trillion to $1.5 trillion).
275. Johnson, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing the Commercial Paper Funding Facility).
276. Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 33.
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of three months and undertook to hold its investments to maturity, that
way protecting the market from more refinancing risk.277 Correctly, the
Fed saw what it was doing as expanding its traditional market-making
efforts to reach new sectors of the funding market. 78 As intended, these
efforts temporarily stabilized the marketing of commercial paper by in-
creasing the volume of borrowing and lowering borrowing rates.279
It was not enough, though, to mitigate the effects of Lehman's col-
lapse in September 2008. That was when a large money market mutual
fund "broke the buck. '280 Money market mutual funds promise to satisfy
their investors' requests for redemption each day at the price of a dollar
per share. But on September 16, 2008, a large fund suspended redemp-
tions for seven days.28' At this point, the Fed took "the wholesale money
market onto its own balance sheet, stepping in as dealer of last resort for
the money market. 282 It did this with two other programs similar to the
commercial paper facility, which also directed liquidity to mutual funds
as their investors tried to cash out.
283
The final program developed by the Fed sought to support the secu-
ritization of other kinds of asset-backed securities.284 This program
sought to provide credit for investors to buy investment-grade tranches of
277. Id. at 30.
278. Id. at 29-30. "The Federal Reserve's financial transactions were limited to open market
operations with primary dealers and loans to depository institutions through the discount window.
The CPFF operation married aspects of both types of Fed operations with the market conventions of
the commercial paper market." Id. at 3 1. (internal citation omitted).
279. Id. at 35-36.
280. Shefali Anand & Diya Gullapalli, Breaking Buck Was Ironic for Trumpeter of Safe Fund,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2008), http://online.wsj.comi/article/SBl22169 845959750475.html; Sam
Mamudi & Jonathan Burton, Money Market Breaks the Buck, Freezes Redemptions,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 17, 2008), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2008-09-17/finance/307382
59_ Ipeter-cranc-rescrve-primary-fund-money-market.
281. Mamudi & Burton, supra note 280 (describing liquidity problems of the Reserve Primary
Fund).
282. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 125.
283. In September 2008, the Fed started the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility to help finance the redemption requests made on money market
mutual funds. Johnson, supra note I, at 22. The program ran from September 22, 2008 through
February 1, 2010. For a description of how the fund worked, see Asset Backed Commercial Paper
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, FED. RES. DISCOUNT WINDOW,
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/mmmfcfm?hdrlD=14 (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). The follow-
ing month, the Fed established another facility to support money market funds-the Money Market
Investor Funding Facility-but no credit was ever extended under it. Press Release, Fed. Reserve,
Federal Reserve Announces the Creation of the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF),
(Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20081021a.htm; see
also Johnson, supra note 1, at 23.
284. What the Fed set up was the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, established in
November 2008. Johnson, supra note 1, at 24; see Jonathan G. Katz, Who Benefits from Bailouts, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1568, 1582-83 (2011) (reviewing TALF as part of estimating the costs of the Trou-
bled Assets Relief Program).
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asset-backed securities based on consumer loans, student loans, small
business loans, and commercial real estate loans.285 It was another way to
reach the shadow-banking sector that had become a key part of the credit
market.286 In the end, it had relatively little impact because it supported
few deals.287
IV. IN DEFENSE OF THE FED
The Fed's emergency-liquidity efforts had worked in practice.288
Could they be made to work in theory? This Part says "yes" despite the
case against the Fed. This type of criticism is nothing new because the
Fed has a contradictory mandate over economic goals whose meaning is
permanently contestable. Inflation hawks want the Fed to raise rates
when inflation is a risk even when this may come at the expense of em-
ployment.289 Unemployment doves have the opposite preferences, favor-
ing lower rates that might create jobs by stimulating the economy. 290 So
Manichean choices and popular suspicion are typical for the Fed. What
was unusual about the recent criticism was not just its vitriol but also the
seeming depth of its consensus: the "blasting of Bemanke from both ex-
tremes [hawks and doves] is, to put it mildly, unprecedented.
291
This Part addresses three major kinds of objections to the Fed's
emergency-liquidity programs. First, many concluded that these deals
were bad policy because the Fed had become a Leviathan-
overextending itself and displacing free market mechanisms. Second, a
handful of critics suggested that these actions exceeded the Fed's legal
authority. Third, many accused the Fed of a public accountability deficit
because it had carried out these efforts without adequate transparency.
285. See Brian Sack, Remarks at the New York Association for Business Economics, New
York City: Reflections on the TALF and the Federal Reserve's Role as Liquidity Provider (June 9,
2010) (transcript available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/specches/2010/sac00
609.html).
286. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 254-55.
287. TALF ended up supporting twenty-six deals involving asset-backed securities and com-
mercial mortgage-backed securities. Sack, supra note 285.
288. The consensus about these collateral deals and programs was that "[hiowever untidily the
rescue was managed, the financial crisis is over." Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 49.
289. The distributional impact of inflation is itself contestable. It makes the worst off worse off
because those hurt most when the dollar loses its purchasing power are the poor on fixed incomes, as
they have less disposable income. Looming fiscal cuts make this risk even greater because cutting
cost-of-living increases is one way that politicians try to balance budgets. Anyone holding a fixed-
rate asset-banks often found themselves in this position as lender-also loses because inflation eats
into the real value of the resulting cash flow. Others welcome some of inflation's consequences.
Fixed-rate debtors benefit from repaying a loan with depreciated currency.
290. George Melloan, Bernanke's Exit Dilemma, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2009, at A 13 (arguing
that the Fed lacks tools to mitigate inflation).
291. Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 52.
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As discussed below, I disagree with the first and second claims. I demur
in part to the third claim, suggesting that the accountability deficit must
be put in the context both of the Fed's counter-majoritarian mandate and
its role in promoting our somewhat tacit industrial policy towards the
financial sector.
A. Market Structure Policy
Some of the most compelling objections to the Fed's emergency-
liquidity efforts rest on rival views over where to draw the line between
the market and the state, an issue at the heart of market-structure poli-
cy. 292 The most radical objection of this sort is the idea that the Fed ought
not to exist, stated forcefully by Ron Paul in End the Fed.293 In this view,
giving the Fed a monopoly on money creation violates free enterprise
294
and amounts to a global "counterfeiting operation to sustain monopolistic
financial cartels" 295 and "socialism. '296 Instead, we should promote, or at
least tolerate, open-market competition, returning to what Paul calls
"private (free) banking," in which anyone can compete to produce a
mechanism to serve as money.297 This argument overlooks the fact that it
was just this kind of wildcat banking that persuaded Congress to create
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in 1863. Moreover, it
would seem that radical objections to the existence of a central bank in
the United States were put to rest in 1913 by passage of the Act. 98
292. The idea of "market structure" refers to the totality of institutional features and arrange-
ments that influence the production and exchange of a good or service. I include the primary market
in this notion although economists often think of it in terms of exchanges happening only in the
secondary market. Peter Dattels, The Microstructure of Government Securities Markets (Int'l Mone-
tary Fund, Working Paper No. 117, 1995). Dattels defines "market structure" as "the organization of
the secondary market including market access, order handling, the trading mechanism, transparency,
the role of intermediaries, clearing and settlement services, and so forth." COORDINATING PUBLIC
DEBT AND MONETARY MANAGEMENT 418 (Peter Dattels ct al. eds., 1997).
293. Paul's position is clear: "The Federal Reserve should be abolished because it is immoral,
unconstitutional, impractical, promotes bad economics, and undermines liberty. Its destructive nature
makes it a tool of tyrannical govemment." RON PAUL, END THE FED 141 (2009). During the 2012
election cycle, the Fed was a target of other Republican candidates, including Sarah Palin, Michele
Bachman, Herman Cain, and Rick Perry, but it was Paul who had developed the most substantive
critique of the Fed. Paul relies on the economic theory of Austrian economists Ludvig von Mises and
Friedrich Hayek. Id. at 6, 29 (mentioning Mises's The Theory of Money and Credit and Hayek's
Choice in Currency).
294. Id. at 205.
295. Id. at 109.
296. He states, "Think of [the] Soviet system applied to the banking industry and you have the
Fed." Id. at 28.
297. Id. at 205.
298. In general, Woodrow Wilson's successes in implementing progressive reforms between
1913 and 1921 represented a temporary victory over the strongest forms of libertarian fundamental-
ism. Another example from the period would be the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913
and the first major federal income tax.
Seattle University Law Review
More moderate objections to the Fed's emergency-liquidity pro-
grams are those that recognize one of the central points of Parts I and
II-that credit markets are often made and remade based on public exi-
gencies.299 Examples include objections raised by the Fed's traditional
defenders, many of whom wondered whether the Fed's emergency-
liquidity efforts had gone too far. Former Fed chairman Paul Volcker
suggested that the Fed's emergency initiatives had gone to the very limit
of the institution's authorities. 30 ' Former Fed staffer Vince Reinhart
called the Bear deal a "policy mistake." 30'I Economist John Taylor criti-
cized the Fed's failure to articulate clear criteria about who would quali-
fy for its liquidity assistance.
30 2
What would have happened had the Fed stuck to its traditional
lender of last resort, helping only banks that could provide traditional
collateral for emergency liquidity? A starting point for the thought exper-
iment is what actually did happen when the Fed did not bail out Lehman
Brothers, which went on to file the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.
303
Lehman's bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, was the low point
for the interbank market.3° Scenario analysis based on what did not hap-
pen suffers from Knightian uncertainty, the kind of uncertainty that can-
not be measured and, thus, mitigated through foresight.30 5 Indeed, what
happened with Lehman frustrated the efforts of authorities to anticipate
risk because the resulting losses and disruptions proved to be much
worse for more parties than expected.30 6 Probably, the destabilizing li-
quidity dynamics that emerged beginning with Bear and AIG would have
been worse, visiting deeper losses against a wider range of counterpar-
ties.307 This disruption would likely have further harmed the money mar-
299. The academic literature on the microstructure of securities markets has addressed market
making in some detail. AMIHUD, Ho & SCHWARTZ, supra note I1, at 1,9-10.
300. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 173.
301. Id. at 174.
302. Id.
303. Five weeks later, Lehman's former CEO had registered his newly-formed investment
group. Susanne Craig & lanthe Jeanne Dugan, From Lehman's Wreckage, New Lives, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 12, 2009, at 1.
304. Hordahl & King, supra note 35, at 37, 44 (describing the "virtual shutdown of the unse-
cured interbank lending market").
305. Knightian uncertainty refers to risks whose probabilities cannot be known or estimated.
Matthew Pritsker, Knightian Uncertainty and Interbank Lending, J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION (forth-
coming 2012). It presents a particular challenge to ex ante attempts to limit risk.
306. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 188-89.
307. Several different kinds of assets would have lost value quickly, visiting losses on the firms
that held these assets. Unrealized losses would begin to accrue, and eventually these firms would
have to write down their value on their balance sheets, making public this material trend about their
financial position. As balance sheet losses consumed the firm's equity-capital surplus accounts, at
best the firm would become more leveraged, potentially triggering creditors' remedies that might
intensify the spiral, for example by requiring that the firm post cash to collateralize its exposure,
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ket, crucial to the short-term financing needs of companies and a theater
for the Fed's monetary policy initiatives.
30 8
My point is not to say that the Fed's emergency-liquidity programs
were optimal-they were adequate under the circumstances, but they
came with downsides too. The Bear deal did create a moral hazard by
sending a signal that the federal government might come to the assis-
tance of nonbank firms that had made losing bets in the credit market.
Federal authorities had their reasons for helping Bear and not Lehman,
but the rule of decision was not very clear at the time. 0 9 Regrettably,
bank lending has not increased as hoped. Instead, banks have stockpiled
cash at the Fed in their reserve deposits, which may provide latent fi-
nancing for inflationary demand that could lead to another bubble.31 The
Fed should, as the old saying goes, remove the punch bowl just as the
party is getting started.311 This time, though, some got punch drunk while
others were shut out of credit.312
Specifically, as a Congressional oversight panel concluded, AIG's
shareholders and creditors received a windfall because Maiden Lane III
paid full value for financial instruments that at the time were being deep-
ly discounted by the market.313 Initially, the Fed had sought concessions
from AIG's counterparties in credit-default swaps that would have re-
flected ordinary market losses. 314 Although Maiden Lane II had been
able to buy assets from AIG at such a market discount, the Fed was una-
which would tax the already strained liquidity of the firm. Many firms would become bankrupt,
causing ripple effects to counterparties and financial markets more widely. Eventually, entire mar-
kets for certain products would dry up, making it hard for other firms to even value their holdings of
affected securities.
308. It was the rush of investors to redeem shares of the Reserve Primary Fund after the Leh-
man bankruptcy that triggered the crisis in the money market that led to the Fed's interventions
there. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 206.
309. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 25 1, at 28 ("Because Federal Re-
serve and Treasury officials believed that an AIG bankruptcy could ultimately have a greater system-
ic impact than Lehman's bankruptcy one day before, they decided that additional federal support
was needed to maintain the overall stability of the financial markets.").
310. lan Bremmer & Nouriel Roubini, How the Fed Can Avoid the Next Bubble, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 6, 2009, at A23 (warning that keeping interest rates low to stabilize the economy may risk an-
other asset bubble).
311. The statement is attributed to William McChesney Martin, a highly influential Fed
Chairman. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 474. The occasion for the statement was probably the Fed's
role in managing the "overheating" of the economy due to low interest rates. The recent crisis dealt
with financial speculation, which is distinct from generic overheating, so this is an analogy to em-
phasize the Fed's role in countercyclical self-restraint.
312. S. Mitra Kalita, The Democratization of Credit Is Over -, Now It's Payback Time, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 10, 2009, at A l (analyzing increase in debt among lower-income households).
313. In effect, AIG's creditors received "the entire notional amount of the CDOs [their invest-
ment] at a time when the market value of those CDOs was less than half of that amount." CONG.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 74.
314. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 251, at 15.
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ble to secure any such concessions when setting up Maiden Lane III from
seven of the eight major creditors of AIG.315 So the asset purchases by
Maiden Lane III were done at par. This perverse redistribution departed
from the ordinary loss-sharing of a bankruptcy proceeding. 1 6 Presuma-
bly, the decision to pay full price for these assets reflected a policy de-
termination by the Fed that doing the deal at par value was consistent
with the stabilization goals of the deal. 3 17 Not surprisingly, the Inspector
General's report for the Troubled Assets Relief Program later found fault
with the Fed's refusal to insist that these counterparties bear some loss.
3 18
In effect, the report suggested that pricing of these purchases created a
moral hazard and treated similarly situated investors differently by im-
munizing some from market losses.
These concerns about moral hazard and horizontal equity are legit-
imate, but only as part of a conceptual framework that recognizes that the
Fed had to mutate along with the market. This meant updating Bagehot's
axiom about last-resort liquidity to recognize a broader role for the cen-
tral bank when credit had become a commodity traded by banks, non-
bank lenders, and other firms..3 19 Central banking experts had already
outlined how such a role might work.320 Departing from the traditional
lender of last resort, the Fed would have to become a giant market maker
for credit-trading mechanisms. 321 Like the lender of last resort, though,
this would be a public function because the need for it arises only when
private market makers have stopped supporting the price mechanism.
322
Although particular firms might be saved, this could only be an inci-
dental by-product of shoring up trading mechanisms as a whole.323
315. Id. at 15-20.
316. Ordinarily, "the costs of AIG's inability to meet its derivative obligations would have
been borne entirely by AIG's shareholders and creditors under the well-established rules of
bankrupty." CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 3.
317. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 25 1, at 9-11 (analyzing the Treasury
and the Fed's rationale for supporting AIG).
318. Id. at 28-30.
319. BAGEHOT, supra note 2.
320. Buiter & Sibcrt, supra note 5 ("Even if the assets are impaired, there should still be a
market to sell them at a discount appropriate to the central bank's assessment of its risk of default
and the central bank's assessment of the orderly market price of risk."). What the Fed did is related
to Steven Schwarcz's notion of having a provider of last resort for market liquidity in financial mar-
kets. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 248-57.
321. Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5 ("If the markets for selling impaired assets or for borrowing
using impaired assets as collateral seize up and cease to function, the central bank must step in to
perform its market maker of last resort functions.").
322. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 130 ("Like lender of last resort, dealer of last resort is inher-
ently a public function, not a private function."); see also Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 254 (analyzing
disincentives to private investors acting as market liquidity provider).
323. William H. Buiter, Central Banks as Market Makers of Last Resort 4; Liquidity, Markets,
and Mechanisms, FIN. TIMES BLOG (Aug. 23, 2007), http://blogs.ft.com/maverccon/2007/08/central-
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And this is exactly what the Fed did. It did not call itself a "market
maker of last resort," although it suggested as much in Fed-speak by say-
ing that it had become a "substitute for the arbitrage and trading no long-
er being undertaken in sufficient size by the private sector." 324 After all,
seeking profits through arbitrage and exchange (trading) are at the core
of what markets do. Haltingly, and, in fact, only as a last resort, the Fed
emerged from the discount window so that it could reach into the shad-
ow-banking sector. 325 Its theater of operations became the interbank li-
quidity cycle. 326 By re-enacting a miniature secondary market for struc-
tured finance through the Maiden Lanes and its secured lending pro-
grams for nonbanks, the Fed provided liquidity, term, and price discov-
ery, stemming the bear cycle. 327 The Fed financed this by borrowing re-
serves from commercial banks and recirculating them into the economy
through efforts on behalf of a progressively wider set of liquidity cli-
ents-banks, then primary dealers, then commercial paper issuers and
money market mutual funds, and, finally, other securitization vehicles.328
Through the Maiden Lane companies, the Fed bought distressed as-
sets and-forbearing the freedom enjoyed by a private investor-
committed to hold them until the price was right, even up to maturity.329
This added term and liquidity. Synthetically bullish, the Maiden Lanes
banks-ahtml-3/#axzz2KUuoKclk ("Central banks in times of crisis should aim to support/bail out
markets and other valuable social mechanisms; they should not support or bail out companies, part-
ncrships or individuals, unless this is an unavoidable feature of supporting market and mecha-
nisms."). Indeed, insolvent firms should be allowed to fail because "Darwin must have his pound of
flesh also in the financial markets." Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5.
324. That is the gist of Fed Governor Donald Kohn's comments in the middle of the 2008
crisis: "To ameliorate the threat to financial and economic stability, the Federal Reserve and a num-
ber of other central banks in effect found they needed to provide a substitute for the arbitrage and
trading no longer being undertaken in sufficient size by the private sector." Kohn, supra note 35.
325. Adrian et al., supra note 165, at 34 ("Effectively, these facilities extended the Federal
Reserve's lender-of-last-resort role to include nondepository institutions (the PDCF, TSLF, and
AMLF) and specific securities markets (the CPFF and TALF)."); see also MEHRLING, supra note 5,
at 124 ("And the big thing about the Fed's response was that it stepped in as the dealer of last resort
to replace the private dealer system.").
326. Especially in an interbank environment where a firm relied heavily on the ability to get
overnight and short-term financing, the disappearance of asset liquidity soon impacts the firm's own
institutional liquidity because it can no longer convert its financial assets into overnight cash. Unmit-
igated, firm illiquidity can soon become insolvency, illustrating what happened in 2008 in the inter-
bank market-asset liquidity became fund illiquidity, which threatened insolvency and cascading
effects on other firms.
327. In a sense, what the Fed was intermediating was the dynamic of intermediation itself, It
did this on one level by breathing value back into assets that had previously served as collateral but
had gone bad in the liquidity panic. More radically, by broadening the kinds of assets deemed ac-
ceptable as collateral, the Fed was imbuing new asset classes with the status of collateral, essentially
creating new collateral markets.
328. Forms of Federal Reserve Lending, supra note 260.
329. WESsnL, supra note 47, at 213.
Seattle University Law Review
boosted asset values and the net worth of owning firms, whose liquidity
problems were kept at bay.33° In time, the market responded with sus-
tained interest in the assets, which were then resold by the Maiden Lane
vehicles.
331
The Maiden Lanes also enhanced price discovery for structured fi-
nance products. According to clarifications about fair-value accounting
rules for inactive markets, when the reference market for a financial asset
becomes increasingly inactive, the asset may have to be reclassified from
Level 2 to Level 3.332 Like a private dealer, the Fed's financial hospitals
created an active market and provided quotes and transaction prices, po-
tentially impacting how assets belonging to other investors would be val-
ued. Some accounting research is needed to determine the extent to
which, once the Fed had "discovered" the exchange value of the assets
purchased by the Maiden Lanes, other investors holding the same type of
assets (or proxy assets) could free ride on the Fed's valuation marks to
shore up their own balance sheet.333 This consequence of fair value ac-
counting would have magnified the Fed's bullish strategies. Presumably,
insofar as the Maiden Lanes increased the assets that could be classified
as Level I or Level 2, they also limited the impact of investors' proprie-
tary models on price discovery because it is these models that influence
valuation when there is no active market.334
Admittedly, what the Fed paid is not identical to an open market
price because the Fed did these trades for another, governmental purpose.
In this sense, the Fed's purchases were "forced," a factor which account-
ing advice from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission con-
cludes might suggest that the Fed paid more than fair value because no
330. Unfortunately, how these assets were kept at bay was misunderstood:
It sounded as if Bernanke was suggesting that Treasury buy the assets from banks at an
inflated price to pump up their profits and thus their capital. What he meant, he explained
later, was that the presence of the Treasury as a buyer would push up the price of the as-
sets closer to their long-run value. But even sophisticated observers misunderstood him.
Id.
331. Michael J. de la Merced, Maiden Loans Repaid, But Assets Still Must Be Sold, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (June 14, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/maiden-lane-loans-repaid-but-
asscts-still-need-to-bc-sold/ ("The Maiden Lane assets have been in hot demand.").
332. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 230, at 4-5 para. A32A (discussing how the fair
value is calculated for a collateralized debt obligation without an active market).
333. For example, the Fed's sales from its structured finance deals revived the ordinary ebb
and flow of price discovery in which rising delinquency rates on underlying subprime mortgages
lowered the sales price of the asset-backed securities and declining delinquency rates boosted the
sales prices. See Maiden Lane Helps Cut Rally Short for U.S. Subprime CDS, FITCH RATINGS, July
13, 2011 (noting rising delinquency rates and unsuccessful auction results); Maiden Lane in Rear
View for U.S. Subprime CDS Prices For Now, FITCH RATINGS, Aug. 15, 2011 (noting decline in
delinquency rates and rising prices for Maiden Lane's subprime collateralized debt securities).
334. More accounting research is needed to see how firms used the Fed's deal information in
their own fair value calculations.
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one wanted it at that price;335 But it is an approximation that probably
made a fair amount of sense given that subsequent re-sales of these assets
have validated the Fed's value estimates.336
The Fed's secured-lending programs followed a financial logic sim-
ilar to the Maiden Lanes. Hyman Minsky's work on financial instability
provides a useful frame for understanding why this worked.337 Broaden-
ing the kinds of assets that nonbank firms could pledge as collateral in
repo transactions made both the assets and the firms more liquid. Hold-
ing investments to maturity (as the commercial paper facility had done)
added term, further stabilizing the market. What the Fed accomplished
through these market-making initiatives was to create synthetic hedge
assets from speculative and Ponzi ones, that way recapitalizing firms by
resuscitating the asset side of their balance sheet.33 8 These benefits mili-
tate in favor of permitting the Fed to act as a market maker of last resort.
Accepting that the Fed ought to act as a market maker of last resort
raises questions about when it should do so. This kind of extraordinary
intervention is justified not simply when individual products are losing
value but instead when it seems that the trading system as a whole is
breaking down.339 Financial crises involving this dynamic suggest that
market architecture itself-the way that pricing and liquidity are institu-
tionalized-is crumbling.34 °
Bagehot's guidance to lend only against good collateral could be
applied in a relatively straightforward manner when the collateral was
335. Press Release, See. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Office of the Chief Accountant and FASB
Staff Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting (Sept. 30, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-234.htm (providing guidance on valuation of financial assets in inactive mar-
kets).
336. Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Credit Default Swaps in the Wake of the Subprime Crisis
19 (Dec. 2, 2009) (working paper) (suggesting that the Fed got the benefit of the bargain on its pur-
chases) (on file with author).
337. Gabilondo, supra note 9. Mehrling also notes that Minsky's theory was the one that most
closely reflected the traditional practices of central banking. MEHRLING, supra note 5, at 66. This is
ironic because Minksy was viewed as being quite left of center. Minsky identified three kinds of
financing arrangements based on their market and funding liquidity dynamics: hedged, speculative,
and Ponzi. Only hedge financing ensured a borrower's ongoing liquidity because only a hedge asset
would generate the right amount of cash flow at the time needed by the borrower to pay the liability
that financed the hedge asset.
338. Usually recapitalization refers to transactions that affect the items on the right-hand side
of a firm's balance sheet. For example, the Treasury's purchases of preferred stock pursuant to the
misnamed Troubled Assets Relief Program was a formal recapitalization because the preferred stock
was booked on the right-hand side of the firms. This time, the Fed was influencing the asset-side of
these entities-in other words, the left-hand side of the balance sheet.
339. Warsh, supra note 26 ("[F]unding market disruptions reflect a striking decline in confi-
dence in the financial architecture itself.").
340. The upside of the cycle obscured the regulatory defects, but the crash made them visible.
Id. (noting that on the upside "[t]hc financial architecture grew increasingly impervious to skeptics
and dissenters, perpetuating insufficient transparency and under-informed risk-taking").
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uniform, namely, all commercial bills. Developing standards for the
market maker of last resort, however, is more complex because this func-
tion exposes the central banks to potentially larger financial exposure
from providing liquidity to a wider set of actors on diverse collateral. 34'
The Fed ought also to have at least a nominal presence in a wide variety
of asset markets in which it may, at some point, have to intervene to ac-
quire trading expertise.342 This would avoid the situation where Fed offi-
cials did not learn about key financial products until they had started to
have systemic impact, as happened with structured-investment vehi-
cles.343 To that end, the Fed should hire specialists with more capital-
markets skills so that it is not surprised by tomorrow's version of struc-
tured finance. 344 The process of articulating public market-making norms
will probably be iterative, proceeding by trial and error.345 As the Fed has
noted, it learns by trading.
346
341. Thorvald Grung Moe, Shadow Banking and the Limits of Central Bank Liquidity Support:
How to Achieve a Better Balance Between Global and Official Liquidity 5-6 (Levy Econ. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 172, 2012) (calling for a "new Bagehot rule" for market maker of last resort
role).
342. Willem H. Buiter, Central Banks as Market Makers of Last Resort 2, FIN. TIMES BLOG
(Aug. 17, 2007, 3:38AM), http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/08/central-banks-ahtml/.
343. A structured investment vehicle (SIV) was an entity set up by some banks to economize
on regulatory capital by shifting some assets off their balance sheet into the SIV, a separately fi-
nanced entity. The problem was that when the assets underperformed, banks often ended up indem-
nifying the SIV investors, a form of moral recourse. Unfortunately, "several top Fed staffers con-
fessed later that they hadn't even heard the term 'SIV' until the end of July" 2007, after banks began
to bear the funding risk associated with them. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 104-05.
344. Buiter, supra note 342 (recommending the hiring of experts in behavioral finance, micro-
market structure, and asset pricing). The Fed has already taken some steps to learn about credit un-
derwritten by lenders other than depository institutions. Beginning in Jte 2010 the Fed began con-
ducting a Senior Credit Officer Opinion Survey on Dealer Financing Terms.
345. One example was the serendipitous way that the Fed discovered the policy value of open
market operations. See supra notes 95-102. The Fed also experimented with foreign currency swaps
more to learn how they worked than to produce specific outcomes in foreign exchange markets. 2
MELTZER, supra note 70, at 357 ("The early swap agreements established the practice but were used
only to gain experience."); I MELTZER, supra note 70, at 19. In the Fed's case, it is a version of the
heuristic suggested by Mark Twain's observation:
[The person that had took a bull by the tail once had learnt sixty or seventy times as
much as a person that hadn't, and said a person that started in to carry a cat home by the
tail was getting knowledge that was always going to be useful to him, and wam't ever go-
ing to grow dim or doubtful.
MARK TWAIN, TOM SAWYER ABROAD (1894), reprinted in THE WRITINGS OF MARK TWAIN 97
(1901).
346. The Fed has noted:
Contact with firms operating in the market helps us achieve a better understanding of fi-
nancial market developments and practices, which in turn is useful to us a central bank in
the formulation and execution of monetary policy, and helps us as well to serve the
Treasury better in meeting its debt management responsibilities.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-87-55FS, U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES: THE FEDERAL
RESERVE RESPONSE REGARDING ITS MARKET-MAKING STANDARD 20 (1987). Private firms glean-
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For some it will be enough to show-as this section has tried-that
the Fed's emergency-liquidity efforts were justified because they made
policy sense as efforts to curb financial instability. However, this Article
now turns to legal and political-economy objections to these efforts be-
cause objections have independently created clouds on the Fed's legiti-
macy.
B. Legality
Law review articles, legal opinions issued by practicing lawyers,
and statements made in policy discussions have advanced three major
arguments that the Fed's collateral initiatives were illegal,347 and I re-
spond to them in turn. First, some have made a substance-over-form ar-
gument that although the Fed styled its actions as providing loans, these
actions are more properly characterized as buying assets, which exceeds
the scope of the Fed's lending authority under section 13(3).348 The se-
cond legal objection is that the Fed took impermissible collateral for
loans made under section 13(3). 349 This argument rests on a narrow read-
ing of the 1991 expansion of the collateral that could be used for section
13(3) loans. The final major legal objection is that the Fed's emergency
ing information from trades do the same thing, as was observed about how Goldman Sachs estimated
its credit risk to AIG:
Despite the limited market transparency in the summer of 2007, Goldman used what in-
formation there was .... Goldman looked to its own experience: in most cases, when the
bank bought credit protection on an investment, it turned around and sold credit protec-
tion on the same investment to other counterparties. These deals yielded more price in-
formation.
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED
STATES 267 (2011).
347. Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal
Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 221, 235 (2010) ("In form, these transactions
were structured as loans. But in substance, they permitted the Fed to move assets off the balance
sheets of institutions and onto its own."). He makes the same constructive asset-purchase argument
to find that the Fed exceeded its section 13(3) authority when setting up the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility, the Money Market Investor Funding Facility, Maiden Lane 11, and Maiden Lane
III, the last two of which were used to support AIG. Id. at 243-46. His careful analysis makes two
other arguments that seem less plausible to me. First, he argues that the investment in Maiden Lane
did not meet the requirement that the borrower be unable to obtain financing elsewhere. Id. at 239-
40. Second, he argues that the loan did not involve a true discount because the resources offered by
the Fed were used to acquire the assets posted as collateral to the Fed loan. Id. at 241. He recognizes
that there are plausible responses to these arguments. Id.; see also Emerson, supra note 17, at 125
(concluding that loans were asset purchases).
348. Mehra, supra note 347, at 235.
349. This is the argument in a legal opinion issued by a plaintiffs firm pursuing litigation
related to the financial crisis. The opinion concluded that the Maiden Lane deals done by the Fed
violated statutory restrictions on the Fed's ability to lend against collateral. Legal Opinion Re: Maid-
en Lane I and Maiden Lane III Loans, AGUIRRE, MORRIS & SEVERSON L.L.P. (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.amslawyers.con/LegalOpinionMaiden_Lane 11 and Ill.pdf.
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liquidity initiatives as a whole may have exceeded its legal authority in
spirit.350 The concern here is that the Maiden Lane deals seemed to target
specific firms rather than a sector as a whole-impermissible because
section 13(3) authority was not necessarily intended to authorize liquid-
ity support just on behalf of one particular firm.35"'
Before addressing the first argument, it is worth dismissing the
seeming contradiction in saying that the Fed acted as a market maker of
last resort (implying outright purchases) by lending. Accepting an asset
as collateral for a loan does make a market for the asset because its po-
tential future value as collateral makes it more attractive to a prospective
purchaser. Indeed, this is one of the new realities of the securitized-credit
market. Hence, it is reasonable to make the substance-versus-form argu-
ment that the Maiden Lane deals were de facto purchases.352
This argument, however, does not give due regard to the overall
economic substance of the capital structure of these deals. In each of
these transactions, the Fed's main interest was a senior, liquidated credit
position with priority over subordinated claims that bore the risk of loss
first. This is substantively congruent with the form of a loan. In the first
Maiden Lane, for example, J.P. Morgan contributed a $1 billion first-loss
position that was junior to the Fed's credit interest of $29 billion.353
While the Fed's loan has been repaid, J.P. Morgan is still awaiting pay-
ment.354 In Maiden Lane II, AIG assumed a $1 billion first-loss position
by agreeing that payment to it by Maiden. Lane II would be deferred until
after the Fed's credit interest was paid off.355 For Maiden Lane III, AIG
350. See supra note 17.
351. See Levitin, supra note 4, at 498 ("Section 13(3) was always intended as a response to
market failures, rather than firm failures.").
352. Mehra, supra note 347.
353. Maiden Lane paid about $30 billion, based on Bear's fair-value calculation of the assets.
The deal closed on June 26, 2008, but the valuation date was March 14, 2008, the same day that a
credit rating agency downgraded Bear. See Sue Chang, Moody's Downgrades Bear Stearns to
'Baal,' MARKETWATCH (Mar. 14, 2008), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2008-03-14/news/
308842781 long-term-ratings-downgrades-liquidity-position. Presumably, the model that Bear
used to price its portfolio is proprietary, as I have not been able to track it down. I assume that March
14 was chosen as the value date so that asset pricing by the model would not reflect any negative
reaction by markets to Moody's downgrade of Bear.
354. This was the case as of August 2012.
355. Maiden Lane 11 paid about $20 billion for a portfolio that had been discounted from its
aggregate par value of approximately $39.3 billion. In exchange for its funds, the Fed received a
credit interest (divided between a principal and interest tranches) of about $19 billion. AIG CDO
LLC Facility: Terms and Conditions, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. (Dec. 3, 2008) [hereinafter AIG
CDO), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/aclf-termshtml. AIG had agreed to defer
the receipt of $I billion of the purchase price paid to it by Maiden Lane 11. Id. Doing this made the
Fed's interest senior and established that AIG would bear the first $1 billion of loss. Id.
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contributed $5 billion to fund a debt interest junior to that of the Fed.356
Therefore, in each of these deals the Fed's position was a credit interest
senior, both in form and in substance, to the residual interests in the
company.
It is also true that the Fed had an upside residual interest in each
deal, ensuring that most or all of the funds remaining after settling its
liquidated obligations would inure to the Fed. This property incident,
however, should be viewed as a separate asset claim distinct from the
Fed's credit interests in the Maiden Lanes.357 The Fed kept the entire res-
idue in Maiden Lane remaining after settling its liquidated interests.358
This interest was junior to J.P. Morgan's first-loss position.359 This resid-
ual has turned out to have real value because after paying off its credit
financing (as of March 2012), Maiden Lane still had about $3.5 billion in
noncash assets, mostly consisting of RMBS and some commercial
loans. 360 The Fed also keeps five-sixths of the residue of Maiden Lane II,
leaving one-sixth to AIG. 36 1 For Maiden Lane Ill, the Fed keeps two-
thirds of the residue and AIG gets one-third.362 These residual interests
were in the nature of equity, but only its upside because they had no
downside risk.
The other two legal arguments-about collateral and compliance
with the Act's overall purpose-share a narrow understanding of the
Fed's authorities; hence, the rejoinder is largely the same. Granted, the
exact scope of section 13(3) cannot be definitively established ex ante
because it is designed to respond to unforeseen market conditions. 363 The
Fed's generative authority to build and regulate credit markets should be
interpreted broadly, as both Congress and the Fed have done.
Let me recapitulate. In 1913, its founding statute gave the Fed in-
choate authority to police credit and money conditions, especially
through rediscounting.364 These authorities were generative in that their
precise scope could only be known when drawn upon in response to a
356. Maiden Lane Ill paid about $20 billion for a portfolio that had been discounted from its
aggregate par value of approximately $39.3 billion. Id. AIG made an equity contribution of $5 bil-
lion. Id. Doing this made the Fed's interests senior and established that AIG would bear the first $5
billion of loss. Id.
357. See supra notes 353-56.
358. See Press Release, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., supra note 223 (providing that all value re-
maining in Maiden Lane after payment of all debts, fees, hedges, and costs is paid to the New York
Fed).
359. Id.
360. See id.
361. See AIG CDO, supra note 355.
362. Id.
363. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 251 (2009).
364. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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market condition.365 Congress also gave the Fed specific discretion to
decide what would qualify as commercial paper, a power that the Fed
used to first narrow and then broaden its rediscounting authority.3 66 Also,
the Act's incidental powers gave the Fed supplemental authority to trade,
a point conceded in a report by a congressional oversight panel that was
generally critical of the federal government's handling of the financial
crisis.3
67
As the money market expanded, so too did the Fed's authorities and
trading operations. On its own, the Fed resolved controversial questions
368about whether it had authority to trade foreign exchange, reverse re-
purchase agreements, 369 and do central bank swaps 370 in favor of broad-
ening its trading activities. Moving in tandem, Congress had institution-
alized open market operations by statute 371 and had also increased the
Fed's authorities by letting it trade bankers' acceptances to promote for-
eign trade,372 foreign public debt,373 and federal agency securities.374
The trend towards an elastic interpretation of the Fed's trading au-
thority is clearest in terms of the Depression-era reforms relaxing collat-
eral requirements for rediscounting, authorizing working capital loans,
and permitting stabilizing credit in unusual and exigent circumstances
under section 13(3). 375 Since granting the Fed this emergency authority
during the Depression, Congress has consistently extended it by widen-
ing the kinds of deals that could qualify. 376 Critical to the Fed's freedom
of action in 2008, Congress in 1991 gave the Fed authority to discount
the kinds of debt instruments from nonbank counterparties that would
become relevant in 2008.377 These developments rejected a crabbed un-
365. Indeed, Perry Mchrling suggests that the dealer-of-last-resort function was already implic-
it in the Fed's mission, but that the growth of federal debt through World War If obliged the Fed to
focus on providing liquidity to markets for government debt rather than other securities. MEHRLING,
supra note 5, at 36-37. So the arc of the Fed's development as a market maker might have been
otherwise, leading to the same point earlier in its development.
366. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
367. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 64-65 ("Thus, the incidental powers provi-
sion could supplement the authority granted in Section 13(3), but it would not give the Federal Re-
serve banks authority to take actions that were specifically prohibited by the Federal Reserve Act
(Section 13(3) or otherwise).").
368. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
375. See supra at note 108 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
377. See id.
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derstanding of the Fed's emergency-liquidity powers.378 Instead, they
reflect the notion that the Fed has enhanced financial stability through
active credit trading, not in spite of it.
It may go too far to conclude that the Fed can "lend or repo against
any collateral, including dead dogs and illiquid CDOs backed by sub-
prime mortgages," but its authority is assuredly broad and elastic enough
to confront market structure as it mutates over time.379 Indeed, even a
congressional oversight panel that was highly critical of the federal re-
sponse to the crisis confined its assessment of the Fed's section 13(3)
activities solely to consider, after-the-fact, other ways that liquidity
might have been provided.38°
C. Financial Corporatism Versus Democracy
These legal niceties will be small consolation to Main Street. A re-
cent letter sent by Congress's Republican leadership to Chairman
Bernanke during a Fed meeting about monetary policy epitomized the
recent concerns about the Fed: "The American people have reason to be
skeptical of the Federal Reserve vastly increasing its role in the economy
if measurable outcomes cannot be demonstrated., 38' Newt Gingrich put it
more bluntly: the Fed "is corrupt and it is wrong for one man to have that
kind of secret power.
382
378. Lender of More Than Last Resort: Recalling Section 13(b) and the Years When the Fed-
eral Reserve Opened Its Discount Window to Business, THE REGION, FED. RES. BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS (David Fettig ed., 2002), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/rcgion/02-
12/lender.pdf (examining history of Fed's industrial and stabilizing programs); see also The History
of a Powerful Paragraph: Section 13(3) Enacted Fed Business Loans 76 Years Ago, THE REGION,
FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (David Fcttig cd., 2008), available at http://www.minncapolis
fed.org/pubs/rcgion/08-06/section 13.pdf (reviewing legislative background of section 13(3)).
379. Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5. This is a humorous way to point out that before the finan-
cial crisis Congress had steadily expanded the kind of collateral that the Fed could lend against. See
supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text. A repurchase agreement (repo) is, essentially, a collat-
eralized loan formalized as two sequential purchase and sale agreements. In step one, the lender buys
a security and promises to reconvey it to the original seller, who is also the borrower of the cash. The
second purchase price reflects the interest paid on the cash loan. Mark C. Faulkner, An Introduction
to Securities Lending, in SECURITIES FINANCE: SECURITIES LENDING AND REPURCHASE
AGREEMENTS 3, 10-12 (Frank J. Fabozzi & Steven V. Mann, eds., 2005). The repurchase market
played a key role in the last financial crisis.
380. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 237, at 79-84.
381. Letter from Sen. Mitch McConnell, Rep. John Bochner, Sen. Jon Kyl, and Rep. Eric Can-
tor to Ben Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve (Sept. 2011), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/econ
omicsl2011/09/20/full-text-republicans-letter-to-bemanke-questioning-more-fed-action (urging the
Fed to desist from further efforts to stimulate the economy).
382. John M. Berry, GOP War on the Fed Puts Bernanke on Defensive, FISCAL TIMES, Oct.
18, 2012 (reviewing GOP presidential debates).
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Seeing this as the GOP's "war on the Fed," however, misses the
383
main point. There is an uneasy tension between the Fed's freedom of
action and democratic values that goes beyond partisan politics. 384 The
Fed's recurrent wrangling with congressmen from both sides of the aisle
suggests as much.385 The Fed's rescue of the financial sector intensified
this pre-existing tension, producing richly bipartisan hostility that is of
note in an age of polarization. Doves have also pecked at the Fed for not
doing more to stimulate the economy.38 6 They say that the Fed has not
done enough for workers.387 Some even suggest that the Fed should have
made markets for riskier forms of structured finance.3 8
The claim made by critics of the Fed is pitched in terms that trans-
cend partisan difference, appealing to the suggestion of making the Fed
more accountable to political- interests. 389 To that end, the proposed rem-
383. Berry, supra note 382. Republican Congressmen have also recommended that the Fed's
mandate be narrowed to focus only on inflation. Kevin Wack, Paul White House Bid Influencing
Monetary Debate, AM. BANKER, Mar. 20, 2012, at 4 (showing how Ron Paul's campaign against the
Fed had mobilized criticisms of it from other Republicans).
384. That said, the Republican Party has radicalized the issue, another example of the "asym-
metrical polarization" of the Congress. A former American Enterprise Institute analyst and a liberal
wrote a book that rejects the idea that both sides of the aisle have become radicalized in the same
way. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012).
As an act of escalation, in the middle of a September 2011 meeting of the FOMC, Republican lead-
ership sent the Chairman a letter opposing any further efforts to stimulate the economy through
quantitative easing. Merrill Goozner, The GOP's Startling Bid to Strong-Arm the Fed, FISCAL
TIMES(Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/09/ 21The-GOPs-Startling-
Bid-to-Strong-arm-the-Fed.aspx#page 1.
385. In the 1950s, Texas Democratic Representative Wright Patman began peppering the Fed
with information requests. TODD, supra note 66, at 35. A decade later, Representative Reuss sought
to influence monetary policy by statute. Id. at 46. In the 1980s, Senator John Melchcr unsuccessfully
tried to increase congressional control in a district court suit, Representative Henry Gonzalez (anoth-
er Texas Democrat) pursued the Fed as chair of the House Banking Committee, and Representative
Lee Hamilton sought to put the Secretary of the Treasury back on the Fed board. Id. at 47-49. In the
1990s, Senator Sarbane tried to keep reserve bank presidents from voting on the FOMC. Id. at 49.
386. A good example is the proposed National Emergency Employment Defense Act, intro-
duced by Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich of Ohio. See H.R. 2990, 112th Cong. (2011). Its heart-
breaking findings document the human cost of the financial crisis and the recession in the United
States: nearly 14,000,000 unemployed; another 12,000,000 underemployed; over 43,000,000 below
the poverty line; 2,000,000 foreclosures since the crisis started; and a record 1,500,000 personal
bankruptcies. Id. § 2(a)(I)-(4). The bill puts the blame on the Fed and its management of our mone-
tary system. Id. at § 2(a)(l 2), (18)-(24).
387. Paul Krugman, Earth to Ben Bernanke, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2012, at 18 ("[W]hile the
Fed went to great lengths to rescue the financial system, it has done far less to rescue workers.");
Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 52.
388. Buiter, supra note 342 (suggesting that this would have meant that the "liquidity crunch
would have been tackled right at the point where it hurt").
389. Levitin, supra note 4, at 438, 450 ("[T]he best that can be done is to try to maximize the
political accountability of systemic risk policy. This means placing policy decisions in the hands of
more, rather than less, politically accountable entities."). Separately, he notes that "[p]rocedures can
thus substitute for legitimacy." Id. at 449. The insulation of the central bank from political influence
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edies for the Fed's perceived accountability deficit tend to involve more
oversight by Congress. Although the Senate has routinely confirmed pre-
vious sitting chairmen of the Fed, during Chairman Bemanke's nomina-
tion in 2009 some in Congress tried to make increased auditing of the
Fed a precondition for his reconfirmation. 390 Several recent bills have
proposed new oversight requirements on the Fed.39' Independent Senator
Bernie Sanders recently formed an advisory panel to consider legislative
reforms to the Fed.392
The notion of an accountability deficit often rests on a misconcep-
tion about the budgetary nature of the Fed's actions. The mistaken prem-
ise is that the Fed's actions involve budget outlays akin to congressional
spending, which do ordinarily involve a great deal of transparency and
oversight.393 In this view, "a Fed promise is ultimately a Treasury prom-
ise that carries the full faith and credit of the United States., 394 That is
misleading because of an important difference between congressional
outlays and the Fed's trading that may not fit readily into a soundbite.
Much congressional spending is unrequited in the sense that it does not
generate an ongoing asset with market value. In contrast, the Fed cannot
lend without collateral, and it must purchase for value, hence it always
generates an asset to offset a new liability.395 Nevertheless, this miscon-
ception became so influential in the campaign against the Fed that
Chairman Bernanke felt compelled to send Congress a clarification about
how the economics of its emergency-liquidity programs really worked.396
Moreover, the notion that the Fed faces an accountability deficit ig-
nores the intended antidemocratic nature of its mission. The Fed leans
is one such mechanism that, by analogy to a procedure, is intended to substitute for the need to ap-
peal to notions of legitimacy.
390. Sudeep Reddy, Bernanke Foes Seek to Curtail Fed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2009, at A4.
391. Johnson, supra note 1, app. A.
392. Press Release, Sen. Bernie Sanders, Top Economists to Advise Sanders on Fed Reform
(Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/news/?id=DE4C73FB- 131 C-
4A25-B83E-4604EAEFCEBB.
393. Scott Fullwiler & Randall Wray, It's Time to Rein in the Fed, in LEVY ECONOMICS
INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE PUBLIC POLICY BRIEF #117, 12 (2011) ("[T]hose in charge of mone-
tary policy are not subject to the same degree of democratic accountability [as other branches of
government]."), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/ppb l 17.pdf.
394. Id. at 13-14.
395. See G. THOMAS WOODWARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.' No. 96-672E, MONEY AND THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: MYTH AND REALITY 9 (1996) ("To inject money into the economy, the
Fed buys federal securities, thereby acquiring an asset that pays interest. In the second round of
money creation, banks, S&Ls, and credit unions, through the fractional reserve banking system, cam
interest on the loans they hold as a consequence of creating checking account money. This means
that for every dollar of money, there is a corresponding dollar of interest-bearing debt.").
396. Letter from Ben Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Res., to Reps. Spencer Bachus and Barney
Frank (Dec. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Ben Bemanke], available at http://www.federalre
serve.gov/generalinfo/foia/emergency-lending-financial-crisis-20111206.pdf.
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against both business and electoral cycles, so some ensuing objections
from Main Street and its purported representatives should be understood
as foreseeable resistance to an antimajoritarian mandate. Besides, the Fed
already faces formal and informal political controls. It is democratically
elected presidents and senators who pick the members of the Fed board,
who serve fourteen-year terms. The chairman and the vice chairman of
the Fed must be appointed by the President and confirmed by Congress
every four years.
397
Moreover, formal attempts to insulate the Fed from political pres-
sure do not always work. The voting behavior of FOMC members sug-
gests that the "ongoing politicization of monetary policy" crosses party
lines, suggesting a structural reality of the Fed.398 Fed Governors reflect
partisan preferences in their decisions, with governors appointed by a
Democratic president tending to favor loosening more often than those
appointed by a Republican president.399 In election years, appointees of
the incumbent party tend to favor stimulus, while those of the other party
prefer tightening that may detract from the presidential incumbent's per-
ceived success in managing the economy. °° Chairmen seeking reap-
pointment by a president are sometimes perceived as unduly responsive
to the money supply preferences of a sitting president, especially one
who is facing his own reelection.01 In general, research suggests that
politically appointed Fed Governors may tend to favor loose money more
so than presidents of the reserve banks, whose hawkishness might reflect
banks' aversion to inflation that would threaten their fixed-rate liabili-
ties.402 So political accountability is already an important part of Fed
governance both formally and informally.
Less, rather than more, political control is needed if you oppose at-
tempts by Congress to raid the Fed to help constituents.4 3 Suggesting the
deliberative limits of a town hall meeting, the 2011 Republican presiden-
tial debates produced regrettable exchanges on central bank policy.
4 4
397. 12 U.S.C. § 242.
398. TODD, supra note 84, at 61-62 (discussing Thomas Havrilesky's research on political
orientation of Fed vice chairmen from 1976 to 1993).
399. Id. at 14.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 18-19; see also id. at 55 ("Although the markets, and certainly the administration,
welcomed the dramatic Fed action, others believed that the central bank had relented in the face of
political pressure.").
402. id. at 14.
403. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 227-28 (discussing Fed's resistance to Congressional ef-
forts to allocate credit to small business).
404. Texas Govemor Rick Perry admonished Chairman Bemanke: "If this guy prints more
money between now and the election, I dunno what y'all would do to him in Iowa, but we would
treat him pretty ugly down in Texas." Lowenstein, supra note 17, at 50; see also Merrill Goozner,
Romney Says It's Time to Stand up to China, FISCAL TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.thefiscal
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The exchange suggests the perils of further politicizing monetary policy
for electoral gain.405 Recall also that it was Congress that approved the
Troubled Asset Relief Program, a bailout program for banks adminis-
tered by the Treasury. °6 So maybe the political branches should look in
the mirror before pointing the finger at the Fed.
Another expression of the Fed's alleged accountability deficit re-
lates to whether it has disclosed enough about its activities.40 7 Bloomberg
and Fox News sued the Fed under the Freedom of Information Act
408(FOIA) to get more information about its financial-rescue activities.
Although the Reserve banks were not found to be subject to FOIA, the
Fed did have to turn over some data that had been asserted to be privi-
leged.40 9 Already the Fed discloses much information, including its fi-
nancial operations through a weekly (unaudited) statement of financial
condition.410 The Fed follows its own comprehensive accounting manual,
which is on its website.4 11 It also publishes an audited annual report.412 In
response to criticisms, the Fed has also begun to reveal much more about
times.com/Articlcs/2011/10/11 /Romncy-Says-lts-Timc-to-Stand-Up-to-China.aspx (noting Republi-
can candidates' calls for Chairman Bcmankc to be removed); Wack, supra note 383, at 4 (showing
how Ron Paul's campaign against the Fed had mobilized criticisms of it from other Republicans).
405. Berry, supra note 382. The 2011 debt ceiling crisis also suggests that elected representa-
tives may not always act prudently. Jose Gabilondo, Libertarian Fanaticism and the Debt Limit,
MIAMI HERALD, July 30, 2011 (noting that legislative antics led a downgrade of U.S. credit rating).
406. The deception is that the program financed the purchase not of asset claims but of finan-
cial claims on the right-hand side of the balance sheet such as preferred stock.
407. Ironically, it was the Fed's effectiveness in stabilizing financial markets in the face of
Congress's slapstick efforts that would attract hostile attention. Previously, Congress may not have
understood what the Fed does:
The Fed's aggressive response to the Great Panic had called unwelcome attention to its
enormous power and to its capacity to act as the fourth branch of government. Its will-
ingness to come up with money for Bear Steams and AIG when the Treasury and the
president couldn't and its ability to create trillions of dollars in credit surprised many
members of Congress. The Fed, it was increasingly clear, could and would act when the
political system was frozen.
WESSEL, supra note 47, at 269.
408. Kara Karlson, Checks and Balances: Using the Freedom of Information Act to Evaluate
the Federal Reserve Banks, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 213, 216 (2010) (arguing that FOIA should apply
more broadly to the federal reserve banks in addition to the board).
409. Id. at 213, 217.
410. See H.4.1 Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FED. RES. (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.fed
eralrescrve.gov/relcases/h41/20121115/.
411. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING MANUAL
FOR FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS (2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monctarypolicy/files/BST
finaccountingmanual.pdf.
412. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, 98TH ANNUAL REPORT, (2011),
available at http://www.federalrcscrve.gov/publications/annual%2Dreport/filcs/201 I -annual-report.
pdf.
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its monetary policy deliberations. 3 The reserve banks have also volun-
tarily elected to comply with the rigorous internal control system man-
dated for private firms by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.41 4
The clamoring for more democratic control may also reflect suspi-
cion about a problem too structural to be solved by disclosure-
regulatory capture by private financial interests. Indeed, some even see
the Fed's independence as an expression of capture by private interests,
one that would justify more public control.415 Here is the nub of the
deeper conflict.416
This conflict is best understood through the lens of corporatism,
which explains-although it may not justify-the Fed's financial entan-
glement with banks and other lenders.417 Corporatism refers to attempts
to blend public and private interests in social mechanisms that serve pol-
icy goals or provide a public service.41 8 The notion of corporatism is not
413. Randall W. Forsyth, Preoccupied by Wall Street, BARRON'S, (Oct. 15, 2011),
http://onlinc.barrons.com/articlc/SB5000 i 424052748703492704576622992970964046.html (charac-
terizing Bernanke's approach to public disclosure as a "complete turnaround from the Fcd's ancien
regime, which revealed next to nothing about what it was doing or thinking").
414. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-I 1-696, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: OPPORTUNITIES
EXIST TO STRENGTHEN POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 41
(2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM].
415. Timothy A. Canova, The Federal Reserve That We Need, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://prospect.org/articlc/federal-reserve-we-ned ("Today's fiscal conservatives prefer to ignore the
history of the 1940s, a period when the Federal Reserve was far more accountable to elected officials
and far more independent of the private financial interests that have come to dominate the Fed in
recent decades."); Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law:
From Market Fundamentalism to a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. POL'Y REV. 369,
388-393 (2009) (criticizing the "bastard[ization]" of Keynesian macroeconomic principles in the
financial rescues by the Treasury and the Fed).
416. Canova criticizes what he sees as the legal academy's general complicity in legitimating
private capture of the Fed. Canova, supra note 415, at 392. His charges against liberals apply to me:
"Conservative scholars rail against unconstitutional delegations but then ignore the most flagrant
example of the Federal Reserve. Liberal scholars who purportedly care about a progressive social
agenda defer to dogmatic law and economics assumptions about the wisdom of central bank inde-
pendence." Id.
417. Corporatism refers to "a system of social and political organization in which major socie-
tal groups or interests (labor, business, military, ethnic, clan or patronage groups, religious bodies)
are integrated into the governmental system, often on a monopolistic basis or under state guidance,
tutelage and control, to achieve coordinate national development." WIARDA, supra note 23.
418. Wiarda identifies three defining elements: (1) a unit of analysis organized around a collec-
tive formation; (2) state control over the group; and (3) incorporation of the group into a mutually
beneficial relationship of shared governance. Id. at 9. This third element applies most clearly to the
Fed's relationship to banks:
The state tries to incorporate these groups into the state system, converting them into
what are often called "private-sector governments"; while the groups themselves seek
both to take advantage in terms of programs and benefits for their members from such in-
corporation, and at the same time preserving some, usually contractually defined (as in a
constitution or basic law) autonomy or independence from the state.
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used widely in the United States, in part because of its foreign associa-
tions and the sense that it may seem inconsistent with our ideology of
individualistic freedom.419 It is, however, a way to explain earlier indus-
trial policies that promoted bonds between the state and private institu-
tions, bonds that mitigated what might otherwise have been overweening
market power.420 Such arrangements may have provided a measure of
economic security, as during the post-War period of prosperity. 42' Even
analytical approaches that emphasize corporatism in the United States in
other industrial sectors tend to overlook the fact that the notion would
help to explain financial regulation.422 I suggest the notion of "financial
corporatism" to refer to the Fed's relationship to banks because it helps
to understand why the Fed's structure blends both private and public fea-
tures.
4 2 3
For example, an important way that the Act promotes corporatism
is through the Fed's capital structure, which blends public and private
elements. It is the private member banks that own the Federal Reserve
419. Corporatism is sometimes associated with fascist and authoritarian regimes. Id. at 12.
Wiarda gives as examples Italy under Benito Mussolini, Germany under Adolph Hitler, Spain under
Francisco Franco, and Portugal under Ant6nio de Oliveira Salazar. Id. He provides other examples
involving France, Greece, Austria, Brazil, and Argentina. Id. at 20. Corpotatism studies have en-
joyed a resurgence in European and Latin American scholarship, but less so to explain social struc-
ture in the United States. Id. at 128 ("[C]orporatism does not fit our ethos, our historic and familiar
image of ourselves.").
420. This is the idea behind John Kenneth Galbraith's idea of "countervailing power" as a
check on market power. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF
COUNTERVAILING POWER 8 (1952) (noting both conservative and liberal anxiety about unrestrained
big business).
421. Reich posits that during the period from 1945 to 1970, the interests of democracy and
capitalists were relatively aligned such that firms made money, employees enjoyed income security,
and a relatively prosperous middle class developed. ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 41-42 (2007) ("By fits and
starts, the federal government had created new centers of economic power that offset the power of
the giant companies."); see also id. at 15-49. During this period, the chief executive officer may
have seen himself more as a steward of corporation for the benefit of a wide variety of private and
public concerns. Id. at 45. Now, however, job security for corporate officers depends more on quar-
terly earnings reports in labile financial markets, which also give shareholders other investment
options. Id. at 75-76 (citing correlation between CEO dismissals and recent market downgrades of
their firm as an investment).
422. WIARDA, supra note 23, at 147 ("A U.S.-style corporate state has arrived unsung, unher-
alded, and almost never mentioned. The emergence of corporatism has to do with the parallel emer-
gence of Big Labor, Big Agriculture, Big Business, Big Universities, Big Defense, Big Welfare, and
Big Government, all operating in a symbiotic relationship.").
423. In a different context, Martin Lipton has used the phrase "finance corporatism" to refer to
a corporation's relationships to its diverse constituencies. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in
the Age ofFinance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1,3 (1987).
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banks. 4  Specifically, Fed member banks must subscribe 6% of their
equity capital and surplus, half of which must be paid into the Fed.425
Half of the subscribed capital is paid in and the other half is subject to
call by the Fed.426 After covering its operational costs, the Fed pays its
commercial bank members a 6% dividend on their preferred stock. The
Fed does not pay an income tax, but the statutory dividend is counted as
part of the gross income of the private member banks.427 Although share
ownership suggests that private banks are the residual beneficiaries, that
is not the case here because the share structure is more like a licensing
requirement, a hallmark of corporatism. 42 8 Unlike ordinary shares, stock
in the Fed banks does not bring the right to net profits. In fact, the Fed is
a money machine for taxpayers because it returns all profits to the Treas-
429
ury's general fund, which is a financial proxy for the taxpayer.
Another corporatist feature of the Act is its requirement that private
bank directors participate on Reserve boards, a rule that-as Chairman
Bernanke recently pointed out in hearings-Congress is free to
change.430 The rationale for the requirements is that industry insiders
contribute knowledge that is hard to come by otherwise. 43' Admittedly,
this arrangement promotes personal relationships between the regulator
and the regulated that create the appearance, if not the fact, of affinity
that may be inconsistent with the public interest.432 Moreover, the Fed's
424. The Fed has a highly idiosyncratic capital structure, reflecting its blend of public and
private interests. The Act required every national bank to buy preferred stock issued by the Fed.
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 2, 38 Stat. 251, 251 (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 282).
425. 12 U.S.C. § 209.4. Banks must also adjust their substantial capital as their own capital
position changes.
426. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-939, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: THE SURPLUS
ACCOUNT 2 (2002).
427. See WOODWARD, supra note 395 (refuting myth that the Fed dividend to banks is tax-
free).
428. WIARDA, supra note 23, at 15 ("Whenever we see government control, structuring, or
licensing of interest groups, we said, we are likely to find corporatism present.").
429. The money that the Treasury receives from the Fed, which is settled through a ledger
transfer, does not disappear from the economy; it is recirculated into the economy when the Treasury
makes a loan or purchases goods or services. 12 U.S.C. § 290 (2006); see also WOODWARD, supra
note 395, at 26.
430. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 4, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended
12 U.S.C. § 304).
43 1. Donna Borak, Dimon 's N. Y. Fed Role Reignites Old Debate, AM. BANKER, May 21, 2012,
at I (discussing charges that having J.P. Morgan chief Jaime Dimon on the board of the New York
Federal Reserve Bank was a conflict of interest); Donna Borak, Fed Official Rejects Plan to Take
Bankers' Seats Away, AM. BANKER, May 29, 2012, at 2 (noting that bankers can enhance the Fed's
function through their industry knowledge).
432. For that reason, mechanisms have been proposed to build in better representation of pub-
lic interests beyond the banking industry. Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Adaptation and
Resiliency in Legal Systems: Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1642-43 (2011) (pro-
posing the creation of a "regulatory contrarian" mechanism to make financial regulators more re-
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idiosyncratic structure may make it harder to assign responsibility for
decisions.433
That said, there has been a remarkable absence of scandal or ethical
lapse on the part of Fed officials and staff.434 All of the emergency-
lending programs undertaken by the Fed were independently examined
by an external auditor.435 Unlike the political branches, whose members
have often been found to have breached ethical and sometimes legal
standards in the conduct of their public offices, there is no such scandal
in recent history involving a Fed official. The absence of scandals is tell-
ing, reflecting a culture of self-regulation and self-restraint, made all the
more extraordinary because the Fed is literally in the money business.436
Central to corporatism is the idea that the public sector gets some-
thing out of the arrangement.437 Strictly speaking, the Fed's annual divi-
sponsive to a wider range of interests); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians:
Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621 (2012) (suggesting the
creation of a "Public Interest Council" to address systemic risk mandate of financial agencies).
433. Seen this way, the institutional features that give the system discretion can also be used
for ill:
It is difficult to settle responsibility for a given action on any single individual or group
among the various groups to whom the prerogatives of power have been giv-
en... considering the extent of its influence on events and the cataclysmic nature of the
events it survived, the truly astonishing aspect of its history has been its ability to evade
responsibility.
I D'ARISTA , supra note I l, at 193-94.
434. The tacit involvement of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the emerging scandal
about fixing the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate may be an unfortunate and exceptional counterexam-
pie of this. Michael J. de la Merced and Ben Protess, New York Fed Knew of False Barclays Reports
on Rates, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, at AI (noting that Fed officials had concerns about the integri-
ty of the LIBOR); Peter Evans, U.K. Orders Review of Libor, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2012, at C3. The
LIBOR is a widely used floating rate set by a panel of bankers under the aegis of the British Bank-
ers' Association.
435. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, supra note 414, at 13 1.
436. A General Accounting Office report on governance of the reserve banks made only the
mild observation that they would benefit from a more standardized approach to waivers of a Fed
director from ethics or conflicts rules related to that director's participation in reserve bank matters.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO- 12-18, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK GOVERNANCE: OPPORTUNITIES
EXIST TO BROADEN DIRECTOR RECRUITMENT EFFORTS AND INCREASE TRANSPARENCY I, 56-59
(2011).
437. The primary dealers owe the Treasury some affirmative and negative duties to help
smooth out the process of bringing a debt issue to markets. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
346. The factors that determine whether a primary dealer is making markets effectively include the
overall volume in government securities, the diversity of customers who serve as counterparties, the
maturity distribution of the securities acquired, and the kinds of securities acquired. Id. at 6-7. This
is the case too with the primary dealers mentioned in the opening examples: they are in a corporatist
relationship to the Fed and the Treasury. Some of the benefits to the public from this relationship
with primary dealers are deep and stable primary, secondary, and collateral markets for public debt,
which reduce the cost of financing the state. Primary dealers also advise the Treasury on how to
structure their borrowings. Bidders can bypass the primary dealers by bidding directly. Annie
Lowrey, The Benefit is Mutual from China's Private Link to the Treasury's Auctions, N.Y. TIMES,
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dend is one form of public return, but the social interest in question is a
more fundamental one-promoting a robust credit market. Specifically, a
major social interest involves one of the central functions of a bank: to
borrow money at short terms and to lend it at longer terms, often at the
fixed rates that businesses and retail borrowers prefer.438 Part of what
happened during the last crisis is that the Fed realized that term conver-
sion (essentially the formula of borrowing short to lend long) was being
done not only by banks but also by a variety of new creatures from the
shadow-banking sector, including asset-backed commercial paper con-
duits, securities lenders, and other credit intermediaries that were doing
the work of banks.4 39 When these new credit intermediaries started suf-
fering from the liquidity crises typical of banks, the Fed treated them like
constructive banks, deserving of liquidity support albeit tailored to reflect
440the impact of structured finance.
It may be time to reconsider the social pact behind term conversion
because the last financial crisis showed that the old formula for term
conversion had changed. A lingering and crucial question is why
banks-more liquid than ever-have still not resumed substantial lend-
ing.441 What the Fed did was to make several important decisions during
a financial emergency with very incomplete information. By contributing
to a new understanding of the credit market, the Fed's actions-and the
crisis as a whole-are leading to a new paradigm about regulation of the
credit market. Yesterday's pragmatic solutions to emergencies by the Fed
may not be perfect when judged by tomorrow's regulatory notions. And
Congress is free to amend the Act if it concludes that corporatism no
longer makes sense for the financial sector. In the meantime, though, the
Fed's emergency-liquidity efforts will have provided invaluable insights
for economic theory, trading policy, and regulation.
V. DODD-FRANK
An unusual troika recently defended the Fed from further political
oversight. The dean of the Columbia Business School, the head of the
Brookings Institute, and a prominent Harvard Law School professor not-
May 23, 2012, at B4 (noting China's recent decision to bid directly rather than through a primary
dealer).
438. This is one of the defining functions of a bank. Gabilondo, supra note 22, at 265 & n.38.
439. POZSAR ET AL., supra note 21, at I ("Over the past decade, the shadow banking system
provided sources of funding for credit by converting opaque, risky, long-term assets into money-like,
short-term liabilities.").
440. Id. at 24 ("The Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency lending facilities that followed in the
wake of Lehman's bankruptcy amount to a backstop of all the functional steps involved in the shad-
ow credit intermediation process.").
441. My next piece on the financial structure of the Fed addresses this issue.
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ed that "Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke saved the U.S. financial system
from Armageddon in 2007-08" and that indulging congressional resent-
ment at the Fed's independence was "trouble."" 2 Congress thought oth-
erwise, reducing the Fed's freedom of action by requiring in the Dodd-
Frank Act that the Fed now get the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury for future emergency lending under section 13(3).
443
Nothing is gained and much is lost by increasing the political pres-
sures on the Fed's discretion in providing emergency liquidity, effective-
ly returning part of the Fed's role to its pre-Accord position of submis-
sion to the Treasury. By suggesting that more political oversight of the
Fed might have helped, Congress and the Treasury are really engaging in
projective denial because it was the political branches, not the Fed, that
were responsible for the major bailouts, including the Troubled Assets
Relief Program. So the Fed is taking a hit for actions of the political
branches, who in this way also gain an alibi.
Consider the long history of executive grasping at the Fed. Presi-
dents have routinely tried to use it to promote partisan and electoral
goals. 4  Even though the formal independence of the Fed is supposed to
insulate its decisions from partisan influence, research shows that party
affiliation of the Board Governors may influence voting behavior.445 This
new requirement in Dodd-Frank extends the formal and informal politi-
cal influence that presidents have on the Fed. This also risks that subse-
quent administrations will repudiate as "political" the stabilization efforts
442. R. Glenn Hubbard, Hal Scott & John Thornton, The Fed Can Lead on Financial Supervi-
sion, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2009, at A13 (criticizing Fed bashing and proposals to reduce its inde-
pcndence).
443. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub.
L. 111-203, § 1103, 124 Stat. 1376, 2118. The political interference could have been worse. One of
the reforms considered and rejected was to have the President appoint the head of the New York
Federal Reserve Bank. TODD, supra note 84, at XV. Congress also considered requiring the Fed to
get the approval not of the Treasury but of two-thirds of the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
which would have been even more cumbersome. Tctsuya Inoue, Small But Important Revisions to
Section 13(3) of Federal Reserve Act, 72 LAKYARA 1 (2010). These are in addition to the fifty-four
rulemakings and three analytical reports with which Dodd-Frank charges the Fed. Summary of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Enacted into Law on July 21, 2010,
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, LLP, ii. (July 21, 2010), http://www.davispolk.com/filcs/Publication/
7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/I d4495c7-ObeO-4e9a-
ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial Reform_Summary.pdf. The Dodd-Frank Act also imposed
audit and disclosure requirements, but they do not relate to market making directly.
444. After World War 11, President Truman pressured the Fed into keeping rates low and
pushed Marriner Eccles out of the chairmanship for not being cooperative. TODD, supra note 66, at
30-32. In the 1960s, President Kennedy made the Fed abandon the bills only doctrine to invest in
long-term bonds. 2 MELTZER, supra note 70, at 316. Angry at rising interest rates, President Johnson
tried unsuccessfully to push out Chairman Martin. I MARKHAM, supra note 37. Unhappy with
Chairman William Miller's policies, President Carter made him the Secretary of the Treasury in
1978. See supra note 41.
445. See supra notes 401-04.
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begun during a previous administration. This approval process allows the
secretary to take fiscal concerns into account when deliberating about
proposed emergency-liquidity programs.
Tying the Fed's hands this way also risks undermining the effec-
tiveness of stabilization programs because time will typically be of the
essence in responding to financial emergencies. 446 For example, the
Fed's decision to support Bear was made between 4:45 a.m. and 7:00
a.m. on Friday, March 14, 2008.44 7 Had these Dodd-Frank provisions
been in effect in 2008, mobilizing the decision-making apparatus of a
political branch may have made the process less nimble.
This restriction on the Fed's freedom of action is also inconsistent
with how the institution has managed its own policy making. When the
FOMC issues a directive indicating future interest rate adjustments in a
definite direction-towards either loosening or tightening-some at the
Fed have believed that the directive gave the Chairman the ability to uni-
laterally make those changes before the next FOMC meeting.4 48 Known
as an "asymmetric directive" because it indicates a likelihood of a partic-
ular policy direction, the rationale for such a policy is to increase the
Fed's freedom of action so as to make rate changes more effective. 449 For
example, in December 1990, with a recession looming on the horizon,
the Fed Chairman asserted this authority to loosen the money supply
without consulting with other members of the Fed Board.450 Some re-
straints on unilateral discretion may be in order, but limits emanating
from Pennsylvania Avenue are most likely to serve partisan interests.451
This exposure to political risk is magnified by a separate Dodd-
Frank provision that requires the Fed to report the establishment of any
section 13(3) programs to Congress within one week. 52 On a monthly
basis, the Fed must also make public extensive information about any
assets acquired through emergency-liquidity programs.453 At first blush,
446. The Dodd-Frank Act also gives the Fed authority to participate in emergency financial
stabilization with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on behalf of solvent depository institu-
tions, but those activities arc substantially more limited and regulated. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L.
111-203, § 1105, 124 Stat. 1376, 2121 (2010) (creating emergency financialization stabilization
programs).
447. WESSEL, supra note 47, at 157-58.
448. Daniel L. Thornton & David C. Wheelock, A History of the Asymmetric Policy Directive,
FED. RES. BANK OF ST. Louis, REV. 1 (2000), available at https://research.stlouisfed.org/public
ations/review/00/09/0009dt.pdf (evaluating belief that an asymmetric directive gives the Chairman
authority to make some changes unilaterally).
449. TODD, supra note 84, at 11.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 11 -13; see also Thornton & Wheelock, supra note 448.
452. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1103, 124 Stat. 1376, 2118 (2010) (adding new §
13(3)(C)(i) to Federal Reserve Act).
453. Id. (adding new § 13(3)(C)(ii) to Federal Reserve Act).
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requiring the Fed to report this information might seem justified. After
all, a federal court did recently hold that the Fed had to turn over more
information than it wanted.454 However, the President and Congress can
now join political forces against the Fed.
Forcing the Fed to make public information about emergency in-
vestments made during future stabilizations under section 13(3) may
weaken the Fed's hand in exacting the best price as it liquidates these
investments. The new provisions do allow the Fed to limit the disclosure
of some information only to Members of Congress.455 But this does not
extend to the Fed's own projections about what the ultimate sale value of
these investment assets may be. Public disclosure of the Fed's own as-
sessments might limit its ability to get the best price for future holdings.
Though not as serious a problem as the requirement of prior approval by
the Treasury, this disclosure rule might also limit the Fed's market-
making ability.
The Dodd-Frank Act also subjects any future emergency liquidity
activities under section 13(3) to other rules, including the requirement
that these activities be conducted through programs with general eligibil-
ity standards open to similarly situated firms.456 Had these requirements
been in effect in 2008, they would certainly have precluded the Maiden
Lane deals, because each one targeted a particular firm-Bear and AIG.
Nevertheless, the requirement that emergency liquidity be provided
through programs rather than one-off deals largely codifies into a statuto-
ry safe harbor the best practices that the Fed discovered by experiment-
ing with its financial hospitals.
VI. CONCLUSION
During its first hundred years, the Fed had cultivated discount win-
dow practices, a bank reserve mechanism, and open markets for its poli-
cy trading that were a model of central banking and the envy of financial
capitalism. When lenders stopped being able to refinance their short-term
loans in 2007 in the interbank market, the Fed updated Bagehot's axiom
about stabilization lending by bootstrapping itself into the role of market
maker of last resort. Grounded in a contemporary understanding of cred-
it, these efforts worked, but they cost the Fed much of the political capi-
tal that it had garnered in its first century. As one banker put it, "without
taking these risks the central banks [would have been] financially and
reputationally safe, but poor servants of the public interest.,
457
454. See supra notes 410-12 and accompanying text.
455. Dodd-Frank Act § 1103 (adding new § 13(3)(D) to Federal Reserve Act).
456. Dodd-Frank Act § 1101.
457. Buiter & Sibert, supra note 5.
2013]
Seattle University Law Review
No good deed goes unpunished, though. In a recent exchange with
Congress, Chairman Bemanke blamed many of the recent criticisms of
the Fed on a systematic recycling of misinformation.458 Concerned that
this might be true, this Article countered these criticisms with an account
of market making that recognizes the need for centralized liquidity sup-
port. Given the new funding model for lenders, the Fed behaved appro-
priately, true to its authorities and its past while pointing-first tentative-
ly with one-off deals and then with assurance through systematic pro-
grams-to its future. But Congress did not entirely agree: the Dodd-
Frank Act subjected the Fed's future initiatives to more political risk than
is advisable by subjecting the Fed's activities under section 13(3) to ap-
proval by the Secretary of the Treasury. This changes the rules of the
game in ways that may portend risk to the Fed's ability to stabilize the
next crisis. This approval requirement should be repealed.
You may disagree with this conclusion yet still be persuaded by the
general method of analysis used in this Article. First, the Article estab-
lished that among public actors the Fed serves a distinctive mission by
making markets and trading in them, this way influencing money and
credit conditions as it was charged in its founding legislation. Second,
the Article insisted that the Fed's most recent emergency liquidity efforts
must be understood in the context of the steady growth of its trading au-
thorities, both through Congress's consistent statutory expansions and
the Fed's interpretation of them. Seen thus, the Fed's emergency-lending
authorities should be read as generative grants of authority to be un-
packed based on the shifting exigencies of a dynamic credit market.
Path dependence being what it is, the Fed is sure to figure even
more prominently in the next financial cycle. That will be yet another
Fed, informed by its past selves and drawing on its new statutory regime
for the first time. The hope of this Article is that when the next major
assessment of that Fed's performance begins, the debate will be predi-
cated on a market-infused reading of the Fed's mission that grapples
more completely with its complexity.
458. In a letter to Congress, Chairman Ben Bernanke suggested that these criticisms amounted
to the ideological deployment of misinformation because they contained "a variety of egregious
errors and mistakes. The articles recycle information." Letter from Ben Bemanke, supra note 396.
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